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CARVE-OUT AS AN ANSWER TO THE CONTRIBUTION
QUESTION IN PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION
One of the most frequently litigated matters in federal antitrust law
today is the issue of whether to permit contribution among antitrust
defendants in private, treble damage actions.' Contribution is the
spreading of liability assessed against one defendant among all defend-
ants responsible for the plaintifi's injury.2 Traditionally, federal com-
mon law did not recognize a right of contribution among alleged
violators of the antitrust laws. 3 In 1979, however, the Eighth Circuit
1. See Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. 78-1773 (10th Cir. Nov. 8, 1979);
Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979);
Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., 11980-11 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,059 (E.D. Ark. 1979)
(letter opinion); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, J.P.M.D.L. 323 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 1979);
Hedges Enterprises v. Continental Group, Inc., [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,717 (E.D. Pa.); In
re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex.), afdper curiam, No. 79-
2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 647 (D.D.C. 1979),
appealdenied, J.P.M.D.L. 50 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 1979); Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., No. 75-23-
N (M.D. Ala. May 18, 1979); In re Eastern Sugar Antitrust Litigation, J.P.M.D.L. 201A (E.D. Pa.
April 2. 1979); In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, J.P.M.D.L. 248 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 1978),
afrd, 607 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1979), pet.for cert.filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3615 (U.S. Feb. 6, 1980) (No.
79-1214); Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1977-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,698 (D.
Utah), afi'd, [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,995 (10th Cir.); Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v.
Texas Indus., Inc., No. 75-2820 (E.D. La. Oct. 5, 1977), af'd, 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), petition
for cert. granted sub nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 49 U.S.L.W. 3321 (U.S.
Nov. 4, 1980) (No. 79-1144).
'The vast class action damage exposure from which the [contribution] problem results did not
surface until the 1970's after the revision of Rule 23 to permit the modem class action in 1966, and
the denial of the pass-on defense in the Hanover Shoe case in 1968." S. REP. No. 428, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 11 (1979).
2. See Martello v. Hawley, 300 F.2d 721, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See generally Brief for
Amicus Curiae at 7, In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, No. 79-2439 (5th Cir. Oct.
30. 1979) (contribution is mechanism to apportion damages among defendants). See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886(A) (1979); Corbett, Apportionment ofDamages and Contri-
button Among Co-Conspirators in Antitrust Treble Damage 4ctions, 31 FORDHAM L. REv. 111, 117
(1962) (contribution is division of damages between joint tortfeasors; indemnity is shifting of en-
tire loss on one whose wrong has been primarily responsible for injury sustained); Comment,
Contribution Among Joint Tort/eaors, 44 TEX. L. REv. 326 (1965).
3. See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1960) (dictum). Goldlawr, however,
involved two distinct tortious acts rather than the actions of joint tortfeasors and placed a great
deal of emphasis on an admiralty decision that was later modified. See note 29 infra and accom-
panying text. But see Webster Motor Car Co. v. Zell Motor Car Co., 234 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1956)
(suggesting that contribution between Sherman Act co-conspirators may be permissible under
Maryland law). See generally Union Stockyards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 196 U.S. 217, 224
(1905) (federal common law will not permit contribution among any type of joint tortfeasors).
Settlements entered into among defendants under current antitrust law are subtracted from
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Court of Appeals in Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty
Supply, Inc. reversed a lower court ruling4 and granted defendant's
motion to implead a third party for contribution purposes.- Courts
have disagreed sharply with the Eighth Circuit decision. The resulting
conflict among the circuits,7 proposed congressional legislation sup-
porting contribution in price-fixing actions,' and sharp debate on the
issue among members of the antitrust bar9 has generated a controversy
that jeopardizes effective enforcement of the intricate antitrust laws.' 0
judgments against remaining defendants after trebling. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Re-
search, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 348 (1971); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfiord, 246 F.2d 368, 397-98 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
4. No. 78-1229 (D. Minn. Jan. 26, 1978).
5. 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
6. See Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. 78-1773 (10th Cir. Nov. 8,1979); Little
Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., [1980-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) % 63,059 (E.D. Ark. 1979) (letter
opinion); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, J.P.M.D.L. 323 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 1979); Hedges
Enterprises v. Continental Group, Inc., [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,717 (E.D. Pa.); In re
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex.), a'd, No. 79-2439 (5th Cir.
Oct. 30, 1979); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 647 (D.D.C. 1979), affd per
curiam, J.P.M.D.L. 50 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 1979); Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., No. 75-23-N
(M.D. Ala. May 18, 1979); In re Eastern Sugar Antitrust Litigation, J.P.M.D.L. 201A (E.D. Pa.
April 2, 1979); In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, J.P.M.D.L. 248 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 1978),
ard, 607 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1979),pet.for cert. flled, 48 U.S.L.W. 3615 (U.S. Feb. 6, 1980) (No. 79-
1214); Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1977-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,698 (D. Utah),
ajf'd, [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,995 (10th Cir.); Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas
Indus., Inc., No. 75-2820 (E.D. La. Oct. 5, 1977), aj'd, 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), petition for
cert. grantedsub nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 49 U.S.L.W. 3321 (U.S. Nov.
4, 1980) (No. 79-1144).
7. The Eighth Circuit in Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Suppl 1nc.
granted contribution but the Tenth Circuit in Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc. and the
Fifth Circuit in Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corp. v. Texas Industries, Inc., In re Corrugated
ContainerAntitrust Litigation, and In re Beef IndustryAntitrust Litigation denied a right of contri-
bution among antitrust defendants. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
refused to rule on the lower court's denial of contribution for lack ofjurisdiction in In reAmpicillin
Antitrust Litigation.
8. See S. 1468, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979) (advocates contribution except against good faith
settling defendants).
9. See ABA, REPORT OF THE SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW WITH LEGISLATIVE RECOMMEN-
DATIONS (majority report) (1979) [hereinafter cited as ABA MAJORITY REPORT] (generally in ac-
cord with position advanced by S. 1468); Rhodes, Professional Beauty and the Beast: Contribution
in Antitrust Litigation, 61 CHI. BAR REC. I 1 (July-Aug., 1979); Nat'l L.J., Nov. 19, 1979, at 23, col,
1. But see ABA, REPORT OF THE SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW WITH LEGISLATIVE RECOMMEN-
DATIONS (minority report) (Aug. 1, 1979) [hereinafter cited as ABA MINORITY REPORT].
10. See Schwartz, Simpson & Arnold, Contribution in Private Actions Under the FederalAnti-
trust Laws, 33 Sw. L.J. 779 (1979); Sellers, Contribution in Antitrust Damage Actions, 24 VILL. L.
REv. 829 (1979); Sullivan, New Perspectives in Antitrust Litigation: Towards a Right of Conparative
Contribution, 1980 U. ILL. L. F. 389; Note, Contribution Among Antitrust Violators, 29 CATH. L.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/11
ANTITRUST CARVE-OUT
This Note proposes that the "carve-out" or "claim reduction" theory
satisfies both opponents and proponents of antitrust contribution.
Carve-out suggests that nonsettling defendants should be credited for a
settling defendant's settlement with plaintiff. The first section of this
Note traces the evolution of contribution in the antitrust context. The
second section presents recent cases that have dealt with the antitrust
contribution issue. The third section lays the ground rules for a proper
resolution of the contribution question. This Note then sets forth the
pragmatic, policy, and constitutional arguments raised in the antitrust
contribution debate. The final section of the Note enunciates a carve-
out theory that will provide the courts with an efficient and equitable
solution to the contribution question in antitrust litigation.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF A CONTRIBUTION THEORY
A violation of the antitrust laws is tortious conduct"' and results in
the imposition of joint and several liability 2 on the antitrust tort-
feasors. 13 In private actions, plaintiffs may seek relief from any or al
of the joint tortfeasors 4 Antitrust violators generally manifest some
degree of illegal intention 5 during the commission of their wrongful
REV. 669 (1980); Note, Contribution in Private Antitrust Actions, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1540 (1980);
Note, Contribution andAntitrust Policy, 78 MICH. L. REV. 890 (1980); Note, Contributionfor Anti-
trust Codefendants, 66 VA. L. REV. 797 (1980); 33 VAND. L. REV. 97 (1980). See also note 47 infra.
For a discussion of the current state of complexity in federal antitrust litigation, see BOARD OF
EDITORS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION; NATIONAL COMMIS-
SIONERS FOR THE REVIEW OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PREsI-
DENT AND ATTORNEY GENERAL (1979).
11. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 311 F.2d 764, 768 (9th Cir. 1963), rev'don other grounds,
377 U.S. 13 (1964); Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 110 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 310 U.S. 639 (1940); City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipeworks, 127 F. 23 (6th
Cir. 1903), a9'd, 203 U.S. 390 (1906); Tondas v. Amateur Hockey Ass'n, 438 F. Supp. 310
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Wolf Sales Co. v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 105 F. Supp. 506 (D. Colo. 1952).
12. See Solomon v. Houston Corrugated Box Co., 526 F.2d 389, 392 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976);
Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 11-12 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Washington v. American Pipe
& Constr. Co., 280 F. Supp. 802, 804 (W.D. Wash.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 842 (1968).
13. See Lawlor v. National Serv. Screen Corp., 349 U.S. 322 (1955) (co-conspirators who
violate antitrust laws are joint tortfeasors). But see Note, Contribution in PrivateAntitrust Suits, 63
CORNELL L. REV. 682, 705 (1978) (not all antitrust violators are tortfeasors).
14. See Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., No. 75-23-N, slip op. at 5 (M.D. Ala. May 18, 1979).
15. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Bluefield Steamship Co.
v. United Fruit Co., 243 F. 1 (3d Cir. 1917), appeal dismissed, 248 U.S. 595 (1919); E. KINTNER,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 14 (1980); Address by Jonathan Rose, American Bar Association Anti-
trust Section Meeting (Aug. 13, 1979) (all antitrust tortfeasors treated as exhibiting general intent
for purposes of contribution analysis).
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acts.16 The common-law rule denying contribution among intentional
tortfeasors 17 gained wide acceptance in the antitrust laws."8 Federal
courts, bound to adhere to federal common law in antitrust actions,' 9
16. But see United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n. 13 (1978); United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 161 (1948); Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v.
Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 907 (5th Cir. 1979) (Morgan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 198 (1977) (parties may violate
antitrust laws either unintentionally or through passive acquiescence).
Finally the existence of "intention" is itself a somewhat elusive concept, particularly
when applied in the context of vicarious employer liability for the acts of employees.
Antitrust defendants are often companies whose employees are alleged to have commit-
ted intentional acts which violate company policy as much as they violate the antitrust
laws. . . . [U]nder no rational scheme of analysis can it be said that such injuries are the
product of the "intentional" tort of the company.
ABA, REPORT OF THE CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE COMMITTEE TO THE SECTION OF ANTI-
TRUST LAW REGARDING RIGHTS OF CONTRIBUTION AMONG ANTITRUST DEFENDANTS 8 (1979).
See also Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 906 (5th Cir. 1979)
("There well may be antitrust violators who are entirely unwitting, but we refuse to distort the
antitrust laws in order to remedy a problematic inequity"), petition for cert. granted sub nom.
Texas Indus., Inc., v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 49 U.S.L.W. 3321 (U.S. Nov. 4,1980) (No. 79-1144);
ABA MAJORITY REPORT, supra note 9, at 5 (courts should not expend energy searching for differ-
ences among antitrust defendants based on degree of intent in resolving contribution question).
The antitrust statutes arguably are premised on strict liability concepts, which provide for dam-
ages regardless of the tortfeasor's state of mind. See, e.g., El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co.,
[1977-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) % 61,533, at 72,112 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
17. See Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799); Batter-
sey's Case, Winch's Rep. 48 (C.P. 1623). See also Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly
Chargedfor Negligence, 12 HARV. L. REV. 176, 177 (1899).
The early American common law mistakenly extended the English rule, which prohibited con-
tribution among intentional tortfeasors, to all types of torts. See Union Stockyards Co. v. Chi-
cago, B. & Q. R.R., 196 U.S. 217, 224 (1905); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 305-07 (4th ed.
1971); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, Introductory note to Ch. 3, Title C, at 386 (1937). Com-
pare James, Contribution 4mong Joint Tortfeasors: .4 Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARv. L. REV. 1156
(1941) with Gregory, Contribution Among Joint Tort/easors: A Defense, 54 HARV. L. REv. 1170
(1941).
18. See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614, 616 (3d Cir. 1960); Sabre Shipping Corp. v.
American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339, 134346 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION, Title C, at 385 (1937) (antitrust violation is too heinous to allow contribution). But
see Brief for Amicus Curiae at 8, 9, In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, No. 79-2439
(5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979):
An antitrust violation is simply not the kind of "tort" that motivated the original ex-
ception to the rule of contribution. A corporation held vicariously liable for the illegal
and unauthorized. . . activities of its employees certainly cannot be said to have com-
mitted an "intentional" tort in any traditional sense .... [I]t is logically inconsistent
and manifestly unjust to apply such an unwarranted distinction [different contribution
rules for intentional and negligent torts] in assessing the availability of the right of con-
tribution [in antitrust actions].
Id.
19. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971); Sola Elec. Co.
v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Co.,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/11
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historically refrained from conducting a serious evaluation of the strict
common-law prohibition against contribution.2" In 1960, however, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in dictum expressly rejected the notion
that antitrust defendants could seek contribution from fellow wrongdo-
ers.
2 1
State courts and legislatures vigorously attacked the common-law
rule, which denied contribution among negligent tortfeasors, prior to
the Professional Beauty decision.22  The courts in Knell v. Felt-
315 U.S. 447 (1942); El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,533, at
72,112 (N.D. Cal. 1976). But see Webster Motor Car Co. v. Zell Motor Car Co., 234 F.2d 616, 619
(4th Cir. 1956) (dictum). But cf. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S.
282 (1952) (federal common law not binding in admiralty action). See generall P. BATOR, P.
MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 800-
05 (2d ed. 1973); Note, Towarda Workable Rule of Contribution in the Federal Courts, 65 COLUM.
L. REV. 123, 129 (1965); Note, The Role of State Law in FederalAntitrust Treble Damage Actions,
75 HARV. L. REV. 1395, 1401 (1962).
20. A number of litigants, arguing for recognition of a right of contribution in antitrust ac-
tions, have asserted that federal common law should not bind courts on the contribution issue but
should attempt instead to decipher the goals and purposes of the federal antitrust laws. See Brief
for Appellant at 7, Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,995
(10th Cir.); Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1189
(8th Cir. 1979) (Hanson, J., dissenting).
The task of interpreting Congress' intent on contribution when it drafted the Sherman Act in
1890 would be an arduous one. See Corbett, supra note 12, at 136-37 (inspection of both goals
and purposes of antitrust laws and other areas of federal common law that have adopted contribu-
tion is the appropriate means to resolve antitrust contribution questions).
21. See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614, 616 (3d Cir. 1960).
22. See National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co. v. Nelson, 260 Iowa 163, 147 N.W.2d
839 (1967); Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963); Royal Indemn. Co. v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 193 Neb. 752, 229 N.W.2d 183 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.010 (1973); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 34-1002 (1962); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 875 (West Supp. 1979); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-
50, 5-101-06 (Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6302 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31 (West
Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-2012 (Supp. 1980); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-12 (1976);
IDAHO CODE § 6-803 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, § 302 (Smith-Hurd 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-258(a) (1974); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 412.030 (Baldwin 1979); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2103
(West Supp. 1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 17 (1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231B, § I
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1974); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2925(1) (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01
(West Supp. 1980); MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-5-5 (1972); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.060 (1978); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 17.225 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507(7)(B) (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§2A:53-A-2 (West 1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-2 (1978); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 1401 (McKin-
ney 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ IB-I to -6 (Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-38-01 (1976); OR.
REV. STAT. § 18.440 (1979); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8324 (Purdon 1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-6-
3 (Supp. 1979); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15-8-12 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3102 (Supp.
1979); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-39 (1977);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp. 1980); VA. CODE § 8.01-34 (1977); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-13
(1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 113.01-.10 (West 1974); Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-110 (1977). See generally
W. PROSSER, supra note 17, at 306-08; Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 1107 (1954); Harding, Joint Torts and
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man," Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. ,24 and Gomes v. Brodhurst2" in-
dicated that the federal judiciary recognized the state law trend toward
allowing contribution among negligent, nonantitrust tortfeasors. 26 Dis-
satisfaction with the no contribution rule first arose, however, in the
federal common law of admiralty.27 Although the United States
Supreme Court initially denied a right of contribution for admiralty
claims in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Shio' Ceiling & Reftting Corp.,28 the
Court subsequently narrowed the holding in Halcyon Lines29 and per-
mitted contribution in a number of admiralty actions.3 0
Congress further eroded the contribution prohibition by statutorily
Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 413, 426-29 (1937); Comment, Adjusting Losses Among Joint
Tortfeasors in Vehicular Collision Cases, 68 YALE L.J. 964, 981-84 (1959); UNIFORM CONTRIBU-
TION AMONG TORTFEASORs ACT (1977).
The tort law trend among the states to adopt a comparative negligence rule, as opposed to a
contributory negligence rule, is a harbinger of the trend to permit contribution among tortfeasors.
See W. PROSSER, supra note 17, at 433.
23. 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (contribution allowed in automobile accident case). See
also George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transp. Co., 126 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
24. 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975) (contribution granted in
aviation disaster litigation).
25. 394 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1968) (nonsettling defendants received contribution from settling
defendants on a comparative fault measure rather than by a proportional amount of settlement).
"There is no longer a legitimate place in our system ... for a rule of law which places the full
burden of restitution upon one who is only in part responsible for plaintiff's loss." Id. at 467.
26. See W. PROSSER, supra note 17, at 306-08. " There is an obvious lack of sense and justice
in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally, uninten.
tionaly responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone, according to the. . . plaintiff's... whim or
spite, or his collusion with the other wrongdoer, while the latter goes scotfree." Id. at 307 (empha-
sis added); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 88 k1937); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 886(A) (1979) (allowing contribution only for such intentional wrongs as defamation and mis-
representation); UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORs ACT § IC (1955). See generally
Note, Toward a Workable Rule of Contribution in the Federal Courts, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 123
(1965).
27. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975) (contribution allowed on
comparative fault basis); Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974) (contri-
bution allowed in admiralty between two negligent tortfeasors); In re Seaboard Shipping Corp.,
449 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972).
28. 342 U.S. 282 (1952) (no right of contribution through third party action for negligence in
an admiralty action in absence of specific legislation).
29. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975). See also Watz v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970) (Halcyon Lines distinguished on grounds that statute
expressly immunized third party defendant from liability); Horton & Horton, Inc. v. Dyer, 428
F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 993 (1971).
30. See note 27 supra See also Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply,
Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1183 (8th Cir. 1979). "As (sic) a minimum Cooper Stevedoring and earlier
admiralty cases demonstrate that under certain circumstances, the Supreme Court is willing to
fashion a rule allowing contribution without express direction from Cdngress." Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/11
ANTITRUST CARVE-OUT
promoting contribution in suits brought under the Federal Employers
Liability Act,3' the Federal Tort Claims Act,32 and the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.33 The federal courts have generally permitted contribution in
suits filed under these acts.34 Congressional amendments to the Securi-
ties Act of 193335 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 193436 con-
tinued the trend toward abrogation of the no contribution rule in
negligence actions by allowing contribution for intentional abridge-
ments of the securities acts. Federal courts not only carried out the
expressed legislative intent of these amendments to the Securities Act,
but also allowed contribution in securities cases37 in which Congress
had not expressly authorized contribution.
38
31. Employer's Liability Act of 1939, § 1, Pub. L. No. 76-382, 53 Stat. 1404 (codified at 45
U.S.C. §§ 51, 60 (1976)).
32. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 982 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2671-2680 (1976)).
33. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§2000(e)( l )-2000(e)(15) (1976)).
34. See Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Minnesota Transfer Ry., 371 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1967) (Em-
ployer's Liability Act case); Kennedy v. Pennsylvania R.R., 282 F.2d 705 (3rd Cir. 1960) (same);
Blair v. Cleveland Twist Drilling Co., 197 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1952) (same). For examples of cases
dealing with the Federal Tort Claims Act, see United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543
(1951); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's v. United States, 511 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1975); Berger v.
Winer Sportswear, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1110 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum
& Chem. Corp., 583 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1978) (civil rights case); Stevenson v. International Paper
Co., 432 F. Supp. 390 (W.D. La. 1977) (same); International Union of Electrical, Radio & Mach.
Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 73 F.R.D. 57 (W.D.N.Y. 1976) (same); Grogg v. General
Motors Corp., 72 F.R.D. 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (same); Gilbert v. General Elec. Corp., 59 F.R.D.
267 (E.D. Va. 1973) (same).
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari during the 1979 term to review the contri-
bution issue in the Corrugated Container antitrust litigation and also in the Title VII context in
Glus v. C.G. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1977). See generally 104 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA),
no. 21, p. 41, July 14, 1980. Recently, however, the Court dismissed certiorari in the Corrugated
Container litigation. 49 U.S.L.W. 3288 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1980) (No. 79-972).
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(k)(f) (1976).
36. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(i)(e), 78(r)(b) (1976).
37. See Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979); B & B Inv. Club v. Kleinert's,
Inc., 391 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 387 F. Supp.
163 (D. Del. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3rd Cir. 1976); Alexander & Baldwin,
Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also Note, Contribu-
tion Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 1256.
38. The courts utilize an inpari materia approach to allow contribution under specific sec-
tions of the securities acts that do not expressly provide a right of contribution. See Madigan, Inc.
v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 237-38 (7th Cir. 1974); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F.
Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), efl'd, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941
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II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW
In the late 1960's the Third Circuit's dictum in Goldlawr v. Shubert39
and a Sixth Circuit opinion" constituted the entirety of federal court
decisions even tangentially related to contribution under the antitrust
laws. In 1969 a federal court finally confronted the contribution issue
in an antitrust context. In Sabre Shioping Corp. v. American President
Lines, Ltd.4 a district court held that nonsettling defendants in an anti-
trust action could not implead settling defendants for contribution pur-
poses.42 The Sabre Shipping court relied heavily on the Supreme
Court's opinion in the Halcyon Lines admiralty case,43 believing that
the Supreme Court's blanket rejection of contribution in admiralty ac-
tions mandated an equivalent denial of a right to contribution under
the federal antitrust laws. The Supreme Court's subsequent narrowing
of the Halcyon Lines decision severely undercuts the significance of Sa-
bre Shipping in evaluating the propriety of contribution in antitrust ac-
tions.44
The Eighth Circuit's divided opinion in Professional Beauty Supply,
Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc.45 represents not only a significant
departure from limited antitrust precedent prohibiting contribution,46
(1971); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), mod#fed on other
grounds, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
Inpari materia analysis implies that all laws that relate to the same purpose should be consid-
ered together to ascertain the intent of the legislature. See Undercofler v. L.C. Robinson & Sons,
I11 Ga. App. 411, 141 S.E.2d 847, af'd, 221 Ga. 391, 144 S.E.2d 755 (1965).
39. 276 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1960) (dictum) (case did not involve the impleader of a joint
tortfeasor).
40. See Huggins v. Graves, 337 F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 1964) (diversity case applying minority
rule under state law to allow contribution). See also Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts
Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968) (Supreme Court rejects inpari delecto defense in antitrust actions),
41. 298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
42. Sabre Shipping dispelled whatever doubt had arisen about the availability of contribution
under the federal antitrust laws. See also El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977-1] Trade
Cas. (CCH) 61, 533, at 71,112 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (relying heavily on Sabre Shoping); Baughman
v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 671, 678 n.3 (W.D. Pa. 1975), afd inpart and rev'd in part,
530 F.2d 529, 534-39 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976) (Sherman Act contains no express
provision by which Congress has legislated an exception to the common-law rule that forbids
contribution among intentional tortfeasors).
43. See 298 F. Supp. at 1344.
44. See Paul, Contribution in Antitrust Revisited, 41 FoRDHAM L. REV. 67 (1972) (Halcyon
-Lines later modified by the Supreme Court in United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S.
397, 411 (1975), and Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 111 (1974)).
45. 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
46. See notes 38-41 supra and accompanying text.
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but also a potentially drastic alteration of the practice of antitrust law.47
Plaintiff, Professional Beauty, alleged that National Beauty violated
section 2 of the Sherman Act4" by conspiring with La Maur, a manu-
facturer of beauty supplies, to terminate Professional Beauty's distribu-
torship.49 Professional Beauty, however, did not name La Maur a
defendant in the action. In the initial stages of discovery, the district
court denied National Beauty's motion to implead La Maur as a third
party defendant. 1 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed this ruling
and granted a right to contribution on a per capital2 basis in the event
that the lower court found a section 2 violation. 3 The court of appeals
asserted that fairness under the particular circumstances 54 should per-
47. See Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 468 (3d Cir. 1968):
Voluntary settlements are to be encouraged and a rule permitting contribution under
such circumstances would not work to that end. Not only would a joint tortfeasor be
stripped of any incentive to settle but he would have a positive incentive to stand trial
and actively participate in his defense in order to minimize his liability.
Id See also McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Panichella v. Pennsylvania
R.R.., 150 F. Supp. 79, 81 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
48. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
49. See Brief for Appellant at 5, Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply,
Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
50. Id. at 7 (Plaintiff did not file a claim against La Maur because "it was a business decision
[that] they [Professional Beauty] made due to the fact that they were getting their line [of beauty
suppliesl back"). See notes 68, 90 infra.
51. No. 78-1229 (D. Minn. Jan. 26, 1978).
52. The Eighth Circuit equated the term "per capita" with "pro rata"; ie., if the district court
had uncovered a section 2 violation, La Maur and National Beauty would be responsible for one-
half of the judgment. 594 F.2d 1179, 1182 n.4 (8th Cir. 1979). On remand to the district court,
defendants La Maur and National Beauty entered into "nominal" settlements with plaintiff. (Tel-
ephone conversation with Charles A. Mays, Attorney for La Maur, October 29, 1980).
53. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
54. See 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
The deciding factor in our decision is fairness between the parties. We conclude that
fairness requires that the right of contribution exist among joint tortfeasors at least under
certain circumstances. There is an obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which
permits the entire burden of restitution of a loss for which two parties are responsible to
be placed upon one alone because of the plaintiff's whim or spite, or his collusion with
the other wrongdoer.
Id. at 1185, 1186 (emphasis added). The Professional Beauty court felt that the contribution ques-
tion should be resolved on a case-by-case method with particular attention paid to the Supreme
Court's four factor test in Perma Life Mufflers Co. v. International Parts, Inc., 392 U.S. 134, 146-
47 (1968) (White, J., concurring). The four factors are: (1) which party is relatively responsible
for originating and implementing the scheme; (2) which party was reasonably expected to benefit
from the plan; (3) did one of the parties attempt to terminate its participation in the illegal plan;
and (4) which party ultimately profited or suffered from the arrangement. 594 F.2d at 1186. But
see Proposed Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 1468 Before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust, Monopoly, and Business Rights of the Committee of the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
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mit National Beauty to introduce evidence regarding La Maur's in-
volvement in the conspiracy." This ruling must be qualified to reflect
that plaintiffs and named defendants had not executed a settlement
agreement. 56 Furthermore, one of only three possible litigants filed a
motion to implead in a timely manner. A tardy motion in a multiparty
action did not confront the Professional Beauty court.
In the aftermath of Professional Beauty, defendants in other anti-
trust cases attempted to implead third party defendants or assert
cross-claims against defendants who had previously negotiated
settlement pacts with plaintiffs.57  In In re Ampicillin Antitrust Liti-
gation58 one nonsettling defendant, relying on Professional Beauty,
filed a motion for leave to amend its answer and to assert cross-claims
11 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Hearings] (statement of John Shenefield) (case-by-case analy-
sis may lead to forum shopping); Nat'l L.J., Nov. 19, 1979, at 23, col. 4 (case-by-case method of
Professional Beauty lessens certainty).
55. See Brief for Appellant at 29, Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Sup-
ply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
At the very least, the district court's decision in the instant case to dismiss National's
claims during the initial discovery stages was premature in light of the rationale of Perma
Ljfe and related cases that the application of equitable doctrines in antitrust cases turns
upon factual findings regarding the comparative culpability of the parties. The court
should not have precluded National's right of contribution without first giving the parties
an opportunity to develop the facts concerning the extent to which National's participa-
tion in the relationship was voluntary.
Id.
56. See 594 F.2d at 1184 (The "problem of how to treat a joint tortfeasor who has settled in
good faith is not present in this case"); Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., No. 75-23-N, slip op. at 3
(M.D. Ala. May 18, 1979) (failure of Professional Beauty decision to deal with settling defendants
is "Achilles heel" of that case).
57. In the wake of Professional Beauty, nonsettling defendants in In re Eastern Sugar Anti-
trust Litigation, J.P.M.D.L. 201A (E.D. Pa. April 2, 1979), sought to gain a right of contribution
from settling defendants after four years of litigation on the main claim, ninety days before trial,
and immediately before the opt-out date for a number of settling defendants. The court denied
defendant's motion for leave to amend its answers and join additional parties.
The Middle District of Alabama in Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., No. 75-23-N (M.D. Ala.
May 18, 1979) dismissed nonsettling defendant's motion to assert cross-claims for contribution
against settling defendants on May 18, 1979. The Blue Bird Body court held that contribution
cannot be permitted if all potential antitrust violators are parties to the action and the settling
defendants have "paid for their wrongs" by compensating the plaintiffs.
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania again confronted the contribution question in Hedges
Enterprises v. Continental Group, Inc., [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,717 (E.D. Pa.) (Consumer
Bag Antitrust Litigation). The Consumer Bag action dealt exclusively with a section I price-fixing
charge rather than the section 1 and 2 allegations present in In re.4mpicillinAntitrust Litigation. A
nonsettling defendant filed its motion for leave to amend answers to assert cross-claims for contri-
bution two and one-half years after the litigation commenced, two months after the last of four
defendants had settled, and on the eve of the final pretrial settlement conference of the fourth
settling defendant. The Consumer Bag court reaffirmed the Eastern Sugar ruling on almost iden-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/11
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for contribution against a defendant whose settlement was pending
court approval. Defendant filed the motion nine years after initiation
of the original action and three years after one defendant began to ne-
gotiate a settlement with plaintiffs class.59 The district court denied the
motion and held that the retroactive effect of granting contribution on
settling parties and the added burden and delay imposed on all parties
outweighed the possible prejudice to the movants from exposure to full,
trebled liability.60
The In re Ampicillin decision to deny a right of contribution incorpo-
rated four factors that did not exist in Professional Beauty. First, mov-
ants in In re Ampicillin were nonsettling defendants whose co-
defendants had entered into good faith settlements with the plaintiff
tical grounds-defendant's delay in filing the motion, prejudice to plaintiffs and settling defend-
ants, and the absence of a right of contribution under federal antitrust common law.
Both plaintiffs filed vigorous briefs in opposition to nonsettling defendants' motion to assert
cross-claims for contribution. Plaintiffs had no interest in upsetting nearly $7.5 million in settle-
ment agreements. Furthermore, an allowance of contribution would have compelled defendants
either to rescind the settlement pacts after discussing their involvement in the conspiracy with
plaintiffs or to adhere to the settlements and risk further liability to nonsettling defendants for
contribution.
The judge in In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, J.P.M.D.L. 323 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 1979),
denied a nonsettling defendant both leave to amend its answers to assert cross-claims for claim
reduction and a right to file a separate action against settling defendants for contribution. The
Fine Paper court held that a grant of contribution in a multiparty, price-fixing action would not
promote the deterrent objectives of the antitrust laws, "since there is no suggestion that there are
putative tortfeasors who are not now parties to the action. Indeed, the settling defendants are not
about to escape liability but to the contrary, have already contributed to a fund for the benefit of
the plaintiffs." In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, J.P.M.D.L. 323, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
3, 1979).
A federal district court for the Eastern District of Arkansas stated in a letter opinion on October
1, 1979, that "the Professional Beauty case makes it clear that in this circuit pro rata contribution
may be enforced among joint tortfeasors in an antitrust action." Little Rock School Dist. v. Bor-
den, Inc., [1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,059, at 77,252 (E.D. Ark. 1979) (letter opinion). A
review of a proposed settlement agreement triggered the court's statements concerning contribu-
tion. The court hinted that the optimal solution to the contribution issue in the antitrust context
would be to encourage settlements and release settling defendants from contribution claims. The
court also advocated a carve-out of the nonsettling defendant's exposure to liability by an amount
of damages attributable to the settling defendants' relative fault. See-ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) A-30, no. 937, Nov. 1, 1979.
58. 82 F.R.D. 647 (D.D.C. 1979).
59. Movant, however, had settled with one class of plaintiffs.
60. 82 F.R.D. 647, 649 (D.D.C. 1979) (court recognized that nonsettling defendant could
institute separate action for contribution against settling defendants, but success of separate action
or cross-claim would be speculative); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, J.P.M.D.L. 50 (D.C.
Cir. Nov. 1, 1979) (appeal of lower court ruling dismissed for lack of finality).
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class.6 ' The retroactive effect of permitting contribution among the de-
fendants who had entered into settlement arrangements relying on the
absence of a contribution rule62 would have been severe. 3 Second,
movants in In re Ampicillin sought to assert cross-claims against ex-
isting defendants while defendant in Professional Beauty sought to im-
plead an unnamed third party.64 Third, motions filed by the
nonsettling defendants in In re Ampicillin were not timely;65 if granted,
the motions would have stultified the proceedings. Lastly, plaintiff in
In re Ampicillin alleged a multiparty fraudulent patent procurement
conspiracy, rather than a limited party, section 2 complaint.
The Fifth Circuit in Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corp. v. Texas
Industries, Inc. formally created a split among the circuits on the con-
tribution issue.66 The Abraham Construction affirmance of a lower
court contribution ruling67 rested on facts identical to the third party68
action in Professional Beauty. In Abraham Construction and Profes-
sional Beauty a divided panel of justices addressed the contribution
question prospectively.69 The litigants had not entered into settle-
ments; thus, the belatedness of the motion or the effect of the ruling on
settling parties was not in controversy.7" Abraham Construction, how-
ever, involved an alleged conspiratorial price-fixing scheme as opposed
61. See 82 F.R.D. at 650 (court should promote rather than hinder settlements in antitrust
actions).
62. See Defendant's (Beecham Group) Motion in Opposition to Bristol-Myer's (nonsettling
defendant) Leave to Amend Answers to Assert Cross-Claims at 9, In re Ampicillin Antitrust Liti-
gation, 82 F.R.D. 647 (D.D.C, 1979) (settling defendant's strategy in settlement negotiations
would have been drastically different had nonsettling defendant asserted its motion for contribu-
tion in a timely fashion).
63. See 82 F.R.D. at 648 (both plaintiffs and settling defendants would lose benefit of settle-
ment bargain if motion granted).
64. See id. at 651 (allowance of contribution would greatly complicate and delay the pro-
ceedings).
65. See id. at 649 ("movant has been lethargic if in nine years it was unable to uncover
possible grounds for contribution").
66. 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), petition for cert. granted sub nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 49 U.S.L.W. 3321 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1980) (No. 79-1144).
67. No. 78-178 (E.D. La. Mar. 29, 1979).
68. Neither the Abraham Construction court nor the parties' briefs offered an explanation for
plaintiff's failure to name Radcliff Materials, Inc., Jimco, Inc., or OKC Dredging, Inc., to the
original action. But see note 50 supra, note 90 infra.
69. Compare Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d
1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1979) ("problem of how to treat the joint tortfeasor who has settled in good
faith is not present in this case") with In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 647, 649
(D.D.C. 1979) (allowance of contribution would nullify preexisting settlement pacts).
70. See, e.g., In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 647 (D.D.C. 1979).
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to a dealer termination suit.7 '
The Abraham Construction court expressly disagreed with the major-
ity opinion in Professional Beauty and refused to alter the traditional
federal common-law rule against contribution for intentional antitrust
tortfeasors, absent an explicit congressional mandate.72 A partial dis-
sent in Abraham Construction called for a limited contribution rule in
cases that involve unintentional violators of the antitrust laws.73
The Fifth Circuit reiterated its contribution posture in In re Corru-
gated Container Antitrust Litigation.74 Several defendants in the Corru-
gated Container litigation, as in In re Ampicillin, entered into costly
settlements75 with plaintiff class in a multiparty section 1 action.76 The
nonsettling defendants, in a questionable manner, sought to amend
71. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
72. See 604 F.2d 897, 905-06 (5th Cir. 1979). See also Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v.
National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1190 (8th Cir. 1979) (Hanson, J., dissenting).
73. See 604 F.2d 897, 908 (5th Cir. 1979) (Morgan, J., dissenting). But see notes 15 and 16
supra, notes 127-33 infra and accompanying text (questioning the establishment of different con-
tribution rules based on existence or absence of intent).
74. 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex.), aft'd, No. 79-2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979) (order affirming
lower court denial of nonsettling defendant's motion to file cross-claims for contribution in con-
spiratorial, price-fixing action).
On September 13, 1980, a district court jury on remand awarded plaintiffs a 350 million dollar
pretrebling verdict against the four remaining nonsettling defendants. Three of the defendants
settled with plaintiffs after the jury award, thus imposing a 1.5 billion dollar judgment on the lone,
remaining nonsettling defendant, Mead Corporation. See No. 79-2439 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 1980).
75. See ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-l, no. 919, June 21, 1979. Over twenty
defendants, representing approximately 80% of the corrugated box market, executed the largest
group antitrust settlement to date in an amount in excess of $300 million.
Prior to class certification, two defendants had reached relatively inexpensive settlements
with the plaintiffs. Between December 1977 and March 1978, plaintiffs extracted settle-
ments from an additional twenty defendants. These settlements were based on market
share, but the settlement price per market share escalated with each new settlement. Plain-
tiffs justified this strategy on the basis of the assumed increasing risk of liability faced by
defendants who had not yet settled, but who might be liable for damages based on the
sales of the settling defendants.
Petition for Rehearing by Weyerhaeuser Co. and Williamette Industries, Inc. at 2, In re Corru-
gated Container Antitrust Litigation, No. 79-2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979) (emphasis added). See
also Brief for Appellees (Menasha Corp. and Stone Container Corp.) at 6, 7, In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litigation, No. 79-2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979). "We [appellees] agree that the
'settlement stampede' in this case was brought about by the no-contribution rule; there is no ques-
tion that [appellees] paid in settlement amounts far exceeding their assessments of plaintiff's
claims." Id.
76. Plaintiffs alleged that 37 named defendants conspired over an 18 year period to fix prices
in the corrugated container and sheet industry nationwide in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act. Sales of corrugated materials are estimated at $4.5 billion annually. Brief for Appellees
(Menasha Corp. and Stone Container Corp.) at 6, 7, In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litiga-
tion, No. 79-2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979).
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their answers to assert cross-claims for contribution against settling de-
fendants. 77 The deleterious effect of a retroactive rule on pre-existing
settlements compelled a unanimous Fifth Circuit 78 to affirm a lower
court ruling and deny the nonsettling defendants' motion to amend
their answers.79
The Corrugated Container court rejected a "carve-out" rule as an al-
ternative to contribution because the trial court had not expressly ruled
on the "carve-out" issue.80 The carve-out theory suggests that plain-
tiffs' claim against the nonsettling defendants should be reduced, prior
to trebling, by a monetary amount computed with reference to the set-
tlement figure.81
77. See Transcript of pretrial hearing at 81, In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation,
84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (Singleton, J.) (evidence of bad faith in nonsettling defendant's
delay in filing motions to assert cross-claims for contribution). The trial judge stated that "to some
extent, I am convinced that the nonsettling defendants participated in joint defense efforts...
without revealing their plans to seek contribution." Id. Mead Corp. filed a separate suit for con-
tribution against settling defendants, rather than seeking contribution through cross-claim. (No. 4-
79-245 (D. Minn. July 10, 1979)). Although dismissed, Mead Corp. filed a motion for reconsidera-
tion. (No. 879-1436 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 1980)). This motion maintains the vitality of the contribu-
tion question in the Corrugated Container litigation despite the Supreme Court's dismissal of the
certiori petition, 49 U.S.L.W. 3288 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1980) (No. 79-972).
78. Compare In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, No. 79-2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30,
1979) (unanimous) with Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th
Cir. 1979) (divided panel).
79. Compare In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex.), (con.
tribution may be appropriate in some types of antitrust cases that do not involve multiple parties
and would not entail a harsh retroactive effect of a ruling in support of contribution), agffdper
curiam, No. 79-2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979) with Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas
Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 907 (Morgan, J., dissenting) (contribution may be appropriate in cases
involving unintentional antitrust violations). See also In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Liti-
gation, 84 F.R.D. 40, 42 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (although contribution might be possible in some anti-
trust actions, retroactive effect of allowing contribution in this case precludes granting of the
nonsettling defendant's motion), afF'dper curiam, No. 79-2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979).
Such a rule [of contribution] should not be applied retroactively where the settling liti-
gants have relied on past precedent in reaching agreements unvarying with plaintiffs'
class and in undertaking joint defense efforts which may have worked very substantially
to their detriment should (sic) those defendants who have not chosen to settle be allowed
to use information gained under the guise of mutual aid to bring cross claims now
[would seriously damage settling defendants].
Id. Furthermore, settling defendants, under the terms of their settlements, cooperated with plain-
tiffs' class in the plaintiffs' discovery process. For the court to permit settling defendants to return
to their role as active participants in the case would prejudice plaintiffs' class. See generaly notes
61-64 supra and accompanying text.
80. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, No. 79-2439, slip op. at 2 (5th Cir.
Oct. 30, 1979).
81. See notes 234-46 infra and accompanying text. See also Brief for Appellees (Menasha
Corp. and Stone Container Corp.) at 13, In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, No. 79-
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The Fifth Circuit again rejected a contribution motion 2 in In re Beef
Industry Antitrust Litigation.8 3 In the Beef Industry litigation, a defend-
ant charged with section 1 and 2 violations executed a settlement agree-
ment out of financial necessity.8 4 The nonsettling defendants sought to
file a motion to amend their answers to assert cross-claims for contribu-
tion four days before the final court approval hearing.- A unanimous
Fifth Circuit 6 reaffirmed its previous no contribution posture with a
brief reference to Abraham Construction.
8 7
The most recent circuit court to consider the issue denied contribu-
tion to a singularly named defendant who was assessed the entire liabil-
ity for a price-fixing scheme."8 The lone defendant in Olson Farms v.
Safeway Stores, Inc. (Olson Farms I) commanded only eleven percent
of the market shared by other potential conspirators.8 9 Plaintiff in the
main claim, Cackling Acres, Inc., nevertheless chose to file suit against
Olson Farms rather than a potential group of more than twenty alleged
co-conspirators. 90 The lone defendant sought contribution in a sepa-
2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979) (appellees "agree that allocation by market share is appropriate for a
case in which there are allegations of horizontal, industry-wide price-fixing such as this case");
notes 247-60 infra and accompanying text (pro-rata and other methods of contribution calcula-
tion).
82. See also notes 66-81 supra and accompanying text.
83. In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 607 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1979), petition for cert.
filed. 48 U.S.L.W. 3615 (U.S. Feb. 6, 1980) (No. 79-1214).
84. See Brief for Appellees at 4, In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 607 F.2d 167 (5th
Cir. 1979). Spencer Foods, Inc. (appellee) was on the brink of financial ruin. Plaintiffs were quite
anxious to recover whatever monies were available from Spencer Foods while the latter remained
solvent because judgment against Spencer Foods would have resulted in their bankruptcy. Id.
85. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). See also note 64 supra and accompanying text.
86. See note 77 supra.
87. In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 607 F.2d 167, 183 (5th Cir. 1979).
88. See Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,995 (10th
Cir.) (divided panel). The defendant argued that it was merely a "passive participant" in the
scheme. Id. at 1 62,995, at 79,701. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, however, and found that the
district court had properly labeled Olson Farms an intentional violator of the antitrust laws. Id
See also note 16 supra.
89. See Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,995, at
79,700 (10th Cir.).
90. See Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc., No. C-296-71 (D. Utah Mar. 26, 1974),
afl'd, 541 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977). Appellants alleged that
Cackling Acres (plaintiff) did not name Safeway Stores and other alleged co-conspirators as de-
fendants in the original action because of "contractual business obligations between those parties
[plaintiff and unnamed alleged co-conspirator defendant] and a desire to weaken Olson Farms as
a prelude to the plan to enter into competition with Olson Farms through a cooperative distribu-
torship." Brief for Appellants at 28, Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-2] Trade
Cas. (CCH) 1 62,995 (10th Cir.). Cackling Acres contended that they did not name certain other
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rate action, rather than through a cross-claim, against four principal co-
conspirators after the court in the main claim rendered a judgment in
excess of two million dollars.9' The District Court of Utah denied a
right of contribution to Olson Farms.92
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that allowance of contribu-
tion in a separate action, despite the limited number of litigants,
93
would necessitate a complete retrial of the merits of the main claim ten
years after the conspiracy arose.94 Furthermore, the court concluded
that the allowance of contribution would prolong the litigation ad infin-
itum by permitting four defendants named in the second action to seek
contribution in subsequent actions from fifteen remaining alleged co-
conspirators. 95 The majority applied the maxim that courts should be
unwilling to aid the intentional wrongdoer. 96 The court stated that
Congress, not the courts, should resolve the contribution question.97 A
partial dissent in Olson Farms I found inequitable the idea of holding
one co-conspirator, who shared in only eleven percent of the market,98
fully liable for a trebled judgment while the remaining nineteen alleged
co-conspirators escaped liability.99
egg purchasers as defendants because "suing the other distributors ... would have disrupted the
ongoing business relationships between certain of the plaintiffs and certain of the distribu-
tors .... We [plaintiffs] were doing business with them [unnamed defendants], and they were
taking our eggs. And it's pretty hard [to sue] when you have 1,200 cases [ of eggs] on the market to
be dropped." See Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 4, Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,995 (10th Cir.). See also Brief for Appellant at 5, Profes-
sional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff
did not file a claim against La Maur for "business reasons").
91. See Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc., 541 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1122 (1977) (CackllngAcres 1). The majority opinion in Olson Farms recognized that the
unintentional violator of the antitrust laws might merit different treatment from the intentional
wrongdoer in the allowance of contribution. See Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-
2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,995, at 79,704 (10th Cir.).
92. See [1977-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 61,698 (D. Utah).
93. Olson Farms named four other alleged co-conspirators in addition to Safeway Stores in
the separate action.
94. See Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,995, at
79,708 (10th Cir.) (Holloway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95. See id. at 79,707.
96. [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,995, at 79,701 (10th Cir.).
97. See id. at 79,704.
98. See id. at 79,707 (Holloway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
99. See id Compare Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594
F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1979) (fairness requires contribution among intentional tortfeasors under
these particular circumstances) with Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604
F.2d 897, 906 (5th Cir. 1979) (Morgan, J., dissenting) (contribution between unintentional
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A divided panel of the Tenth Circuit again denied contribution be-
tween Olson Farms and the same alleged co-conspirators in a second
price-fixing action'00 brought by Cackling Acres. t° ' Defendant in Ol-
son Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (Olson Farms 11) 12 sought con-
tribution by cross-claim1 3 from named defendants for a settlement
agreement executed between Olson Farms and plaintiff."°n
In Olson Farms II the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed'05 its desire to await
congressional action on the contribution issue.'0 6 The Olson Farms 11
court also noted that contribution might result in delays and procedural
and substantive complications. 0 7 Finally, the Tenth Circuit in Olson
Farms II rejected Olson Farms' attempt to distinguish Olson Farms I
on procedural grounds. The court found irrelevant the fact that Olson
Farms asserted its claim for contribution in the main action rather than
in a separate suit.' Justice Holloway reaffirmed his partial dissent in
tortfeasors may be permissible) and In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D.
40, 41 (S.D. Tex.) (contribution might be allowable in cases that do not involve multiple parties or
previously executed settlement agreements), aff'dper curiam, No. 79-2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979).
100. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
101. Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc., No. C-75-472 (D. Utah Dec. 19, 1977) (Cack-
ling Acres I).
102. Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. 78-1773 (10th Cir. Nov. 8, 1979) (Olson
Farms 11).
103. In Olson Farms! Olson Farms attempted to assert cross-claims for contribution against
three defendants named in Cackling Acres 11. Cackling Acres failed again to name Safeway
Stores as a defendant in the second action. In Olson Farms 11 Olson Farms unsuccessfully sought
to implead Safeway Stores. The appellant in Olson Farms I filed a separate action for contribu-
tion against the defendants unnamed in Cackling Acres L
104. See Brief for Appellees at 18, Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. 78-1773
(10th Cir. Nov. 8, 1979).
It would be one thing to permit contribution where an antitrust action has been tried to
judgment. . . but, it would be quite another thing to permit contribution where, as here,
no judgment of liability has ever been rendered, and the action has been dismissed by
the only antitrust plaintiffs that Congress has given standing to sue.
!d.
105. See text accompanying note 95 supra.
106. No. 78-1773, slip op. at 4 (10th Cir. Nov. 8, 1979) (Olson Farms fl). See also note 97
supra and accompanying text.
107. See No. 78-1773, slip op. at 4 (10th Cir. Nov. 8, 1979) (granting of motion for contribu-
tion would greatly complicate adjudication of main claim and would have serious retroactive
effect on settlements negotiated between cross-claimants and plaintiffs). See Brief for Appellees at
19, Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. 78-1773 (10th Cir. Nov. 8, 1979) (granting of
motion would place heavy burden on the court).
108. See Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. 78-1773, slip op. at 4 (10th Cir. Nov. 8,
1979).
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Olson Farms I109 and advocated the application of a limited contribu-
tion rule when equitable circumstances merit its use." 0
In the event that contribution is allowed under the antitrust laws,
courts will need to determine the appropriate method of calculating
contribution. The Professional Beauty court granted contribution on a
pro rata (per capita) basis."' The amount of contribution paid by a
defendant in a pro rata method depends on the number of wrongdoers.
The Gomes court adopted a relative (comparative) fault measure." t2
The relative fault measure demands that each defendant absorb the
percentage of the judgment that best approximates its relative fault.
The court in Olson Farms I, in dictum, proposed a comparative ben-
efit analysis.13 A comparative benefit analysis requires a defendant to
accept a share of the judgment that reflects profits received as a result
of the violation. Contribution based on a defendant's market share
may be an appropriate method in a multiparty, horizontal price-fixing
conspiracy because all members of the conspiracy adhere to the same
illegal agreement."14
III. CONDITIONS OF ANALYSIS
An effective resolution of the contribution question requires accept-
ance of several fundamental principles. First, certainty of the law plays
an integral role in the implementation and enforcement of the antitrust
laws." 5 Corporate officials must be certain of the possible adverse con-
109. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
110. See Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. 78-1773, slip op. at 5 (10th Cir. Nov. 8,
1979) (Holloway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I 11. See Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179,
1182 n.4 (8th Cir. 1979) (benefits of pro-rata technique are its deterrent value and simplicity of
application). Compare Ruder, Multile Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases.: Aiding and
Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pad Delecto, Indemnfcation and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597,
650 (1972) (contribution in securities cases is generally administered on pro-rata basis) with ABA,
REPORT OF THE CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE COMMrrEE TO THE SECTION ON ANTITRUST
LAW REGARDING RIGHTS OF CONTRIBUTION AMONG ANTITRUST DEFENDANTS at 21 (Aug. 14,
1979) (numerous drawbacks of pro-rata method).
112. 394 F.2d 465, 468-69 (3d Cir. 1968). See also United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421
U.S. 397 (1975) (comparative fault measure used in admiralty); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 886(A), comment h (1979).
113. See [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,995, at 79,704 (10th Cir.).
114. See ABA MAJORITY REPORT, supra note 9, at 3; S. REP. No. 428, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 22
n.7 (1979) (market share method is also easily administered).
115. ABA MAJORITY REPORT, supra note 9, at 9. See Brief for Appelles (Menasha Corp. &
Stone Container Corp.) at 6, In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, No. 79-2439 (5th
[Vol. 58:975
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sequences of a business decision. Members of the antitrust bar must be
equally certain of the law to properly counsel their clients. Conse-
quently, a decisive answer to the contribution problem is critical.' 1 6
Resolution of the contribution issue also must comport with the pur-
pose of the antitrust laws."17 Blind adherence to federal common law
will not result in a well reasoned solution." 8 Alternatively, an analysis
based entirely on statutory interpretation would exclude consideration
of the realities of antitrust practice, judicial insights to the contribution
issue, and equitable concerns. 119
The contribution dilemma must be resolved prospectively without
the presence of proposed settlements.120  The arguments advanced by
litigants and courts in cases that have dealt with contribution sought in
an untimely motion' 2 ' or with contribution's effect on pending settle-
ments122 should not be dispositive.
The primary concern in antitrust practice is with settlement. 2 3 The
Cir. Oct. 30, 1979) (affirming lower court's dismissal of motions to file cross-claims for contribu-
tion). "There is a need for certainty in the law affecting settlement. The settlement of a lawsuit is
designed to achieve civil peace, but peace necessarily includes certainty of result. If the law is
genuinely to be that settlements are favored, then the law must be clear and certain." Id.
116. See Nat'l L.J., Nov. 19, 1979, at 23, col. 4 (Professional Beauty case-by-case method of
resolving contribution question is wholly inadequate to insure plaintiffs' and defendants' inter-
ests).
117. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1910) (purpose of antitrust laws is
to protect public welfare by preserving competition and promoting unfettered allocation of re-
sources in marketplace). See also Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978)
(antitrust laws compensate injured parties and deprive wrongdoers of fruits of their illegalities);
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972) (antitrust laws serve as deterrent to anticom-
petitive practices); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968)
(private treble damage action greatest deterrent to unscrupulous businessmen); United States v.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957) (goal of antitrust laws to deter business
practices that harm marketplace); 38 MINN. L. RE. 883, 886 (1954) (national antitrust policy to
favor competition and encourage private antitrust suits).
118. See Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179,
1189 (8th Cir. 1979) (Hanson, J., dissenting).
119. See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
120. See Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,995 (10th
Cir.) (Olson Farms /); Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th
Cir. 1979), petition for cert. granted sub nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 49
U.S.L.W. 3321 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1980) (No. 79-1144); Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National
Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979); Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., [1980-
1] Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 63,059 (E.D. Ark. 1979) (letter opinion).
121. See notes 57, 59, 66 supra and accompanying text.
122. See notes 59, 61, 63, 79, 107 supra and accompanying text.
123. See Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 234-35 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 963 (1975) (preference for settlement in antitrust litigation). "Plaintiffs have no interest
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settlement alternative provides the injured plaintiff with some measure
of recovery without the attendant burdens of a prolonged trial.124 Ad-
ditionally, a small corporate defendant may decide that defending
against the allegation is financially unfeasible because of the expense of
litigation.125 The issues in need of judicial attention without the settle-
ment alternative would overcome the judiciary and thus impair speedy
enforcement of the antitrust laws.1 26
Resolution of the contribution question also may hinge on the type
of antitrust infraction. 7 The unintentional violator may be more de-
serving of contribution than the intentional antitrust tortfeasor. 128 The
courts could treat price-fixing co-conspirators differently from partici-
pants in an illegal territorial allocation scheme. 29 The small corporate
defendant might merit contribution more than a large corporate de-
fendant. 30 The feasibility of a rule that allows contribution under
some conditions and not under other circumstances (split-rule), how-
ever, has been seriously questioned.' 3 ' The objectives of the antitrust
laws would not be furthered by adopting contribution under some sec-
tions of the antitrust laws and not under others.' 3 2 A "split-rule" would
lessen the desired certainty and deterrent value of a contribution
in forcing a small company to bear the burden of lengthy and extraordinarily expensive litigation
and the risk of bankruptcy." S. REP. No. 428, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1979). Plaintiffs also may
require settlements to finance the continuance of litigation.
124. See Memorandum of Hedges Enterprises (plaintiff) Contra Motion of Defendant (Amer-
ican Bag and Paper Corp.) to Amend Answers and Join Additional Parties at 8, Hedges Enter-
prises v. Continental Group, Inc., [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,717 (E.D. Pa.).
125. See note 84 supra and accompanying text; Brief for Appellees (Owens-Illinois, Inc.) at 2,
In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, No. 79-2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979) (appellees
settled "to avoid thereby the trouble and expense of further litigation and the possibility.., of
potential judgment liability for the massive amounts being claimed by plaintiffs").
126. See Weight Watchers of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455 F.2d 77.0,
773 (2d Cir. 1972) (strong judicial preference for settlements in antitrust class action litigation).
See also note 47 supra.
127. See S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
128. See Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,995, at
79,704 (10th Cir.); Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 908 (5th
Cir. 1979) (Morgan, J., dissenting).
129. See S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). See also Nat'l L.J., Nov. 19, 1979, at 23, col. 4
(if contribution agreed upon, its implementation should be carried out gradually, possibly begin-
ning in price-fixing arena). The defendants charged under section 2 in Professionalheauiy would
not have been granted a right of contribution under S. 1468.
130. S. REP. No. 428, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1979) (small businesses an "endangered spe-
cies").
131. See notes 15 and 16 supra.
132. ABA MAJoRiTY REPORT, supra note 9, at 5, 12.
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rule. 133
It also has been argued that contribution should be allowed only in
cross-claims against parties named as defendants in the action 34 or,
alternatively, in a separate action distinct from the main claim. 135 The
inconclusiveness of either proposal mandates that a bifurcated contri-
bution rule based on procedural variances should not be adopted.136
IV. PRIMARY ARGUMENTS ADVANCED IN THE
CONTRIBUTION DEBATE
Proponents offer three principle arguments in support of contribu-
tion. First, a no contribution rule promotes collusion among plaintiffs
and defendants who are skilled at the "settlement game."'' 37 Collusion
133. See note 115 supra and accompanying text. The wrongdoer and defense counsel are
often unsure of the exact categorization of the illegal conduct until the trier of fact has labeled the
violation a section 1, section 2, or Clayton Act infraction. Thus, the desired certainty and deter-
rent value under a split contribution rule would be severely diminished.
134. See Memorandum by Defendant (Potlach Corp.) Concerning the Right of Treble Dam-
age Antitrust Defendants to Contribution at 27, 30, In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation,
J.P.M.D.L. 323 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 1979).
135. See Brief for Appellant at 29, Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-2] Trade
Cas. (CCH) 62,995 (10th Cir.). See also note 104 supra.
136. See Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. 78-1773, slip op. at 4 (10th Cir. Nov. 8,
1979). See also In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40,42 (S.D. Tex.), af'd
per curiam, No. 79-2439 (Oct. 30, 1979).
137. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1185-86
(8th Cir. 1979). See also Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) T
62,995, at 79,706 (10th Cir.) (Holloway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
A frequent example of the "settlement game" is the Corrugated Container litigation.
The strategy of the plaintiffs was to break the defendants' ranks by offering discounted
settlements to a few initially in order to pressure subsequent settlements at a higher price.
The plaintiffs were successful, settling with the first defendant at $500,000.00perpercent-
agepoint of market share, and the second at $1 million. . . .Since this [settling] defend-
ant was now protected from having to share in paying off that sum [judgment], the
liability of the other defendants thus increased for all practical purposes by that [settle-
ment] amount overnight. This dramatic escalation in liability increased the settlement
pressure as other defendants--now paying at a rate of $2 million a point and rising-
sought to protect themselves. Because the damages attributable to these settling defend-
ants also remained in the case, the damage exposure and settlement price thus continued
to increase greatly for nonsettling defendants every time another defendant settled.
The upshot was that Green Bay Packaging, all the while protesting its innocence, was
forced into a settlement which was proportionately more expensive than that borne by
those who settled out early. More specifically, Green Bay settled at $3.5 million apoint
for a total of $5.5 million. A small, unindicted family-owned business thus had to pay at
a rate three and one-half times greater than a company which pleaded nolo and which
had a market share nearly five times larger.
S. REP. No. 428, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 15 (1979) (emphasis added).
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may result in a favorable, early settlement agreement 38 or in plaintiff's
failure to name a party as a defendant in the original action.139 Both
types of collusive practices work to the detriment of less culpable,
named defendants.
Critics of contribution reply that the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure currently guard against the possibility of collusive settlement
agreements by requiring court approval of settlements.' 40  Further-
more, evidence of the frequency of collusive activities under the present
no contribution rule is extremely sketchy.14' A contribution rule may
actually aggravate the incidence of collusive practices among litigants
by compelling defendants to participate in sharing agreements.' 42
The second chief contention of advocates of a contribution rule is
that the current state of the law coerces defendants into settlement ar-
138. See Address by Jonathan Rose, American Bar Association Antitrust Section Meeting
(Aug. 13, 1979).
139. See Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179,
1185 (8th Cir. 1979) ("a large or powerful tortfeasor has sufficient economic influence to prevent a
plaintiff from including it as a defendant"); Brief for Appellant at 19, Professional Beauty Supply,
Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff will refuse to name
potential defendant because latter has muscle in the business community or plaintiff does not wish
to alienate valuable witness); id. at 7 (plaintiffs considered La Maur a wrongdoer but refrained
from filing suit against La Maur because plaintiffs line of business had been reinstated). But see
note 90 supra.
Plaintiffs business relationships, protectable under the current no contribution rule, may be
endangered if defendants are allowed to implead for contribution. Plaintiffs may be forced to
forego suit entirely to perpetuate business ties, rather than allow named defendants to implead
and aggravate parties whom plaintiff requires to remain in business.
140. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, J.P.M.D.L. 323, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3,
1979); FED. R. Civ. P.23(e). See also Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400,405 (7th Cir.
1974) (federal courts procedurally well equipped to inspect intentions behind settlement), cert,
denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
141. See ABA MINORITY REPORT, supra note 9, at 1; S. REP. No. 428, 96th Cong., Ist Sess, 37
(1979). See also Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 75-23-N, slip op. at 4 (M.D. Ala. May 18, 1979)
(collusion cannot be factor in resolution of contribution issue when plaintiffs have offered same
settlement package to all defendants).
If a nonsettling defendant could substantiate the collusion, he "may well have an independent
cause of action." Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 902 (5th
Cir. 1979). Further, a plaintifis failure to name an alleged co-conspirator a party to the action is
not necessarily for fraudulent purposes. See note 90 supra.
142. See Transcript of pretrial hearing at 81, In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation,
84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (Singleton, J.) ("I'm persuaded that the non-settling defendants
participated in joint defense efforts ... without revealing their plans to allege to claim contribu-
tion").
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rangements. 143 The actual risk of a nonsettling defendant's liability in-
creases inversely to the number of nonsettling defendants because
fewer defendants are left to share in the judgment. 44 Consequently, a
nonsettling defendant may be coerced into negotiating a settlement ir-
respective of his culpability. 45 Nonsettling defendants face a "Hob-
son's choice of paying an extortionate settlement or risking a judgment
in the billions of dollars if they go to trial."'' 46 Conversely, opponents
of contribution argue that a contribution rule also may coerce defend-
ants into settlement. The adoption of a contribution rule would en-
courage defendants to enter into "sharing agreements" (joint settlement
agreements). 47 Larger, more powerful defendants therefore might ex-
ert undue influence on the defendant who maintains innocence and
does not wish to enter a "sharing agreement." Under the present no
contribution rule, a litigant cannot coerce a defendant to settle because
a defendant always possesses an opportunity to force a trial on the mer-
its. ' 48
The third fundamental plea of the contribution proponents is that
equity and fairness cannot allow one wrongdoer to absorb a trebled
judgment1 49 for wrongs committed by equally, or perhaps more culpa-
ble, parties. 150 A contribution rule would encourage defendants to ex-
143. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40, 41 (S.D. Tex.), ajf'd
per curiam, No. 79-2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979).
144. See Brief for Appellees (Weyerhaeuser Corp. and Williamette Industries) at 8, In re Cor-
rugated Container Antitrust Litigation, No. 79-2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979).
145. Brief for Appellees (Menasha Corp. and Stone Container Corp.) at 4, In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litigation, No. 79-2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979); ABA MAJORITY REPORT,
supra note 9, at 4 (small, regional defendants maintaining total innocence coerced to settle).
146. Petition for Rehearing (Weyerhaeuser Corp. and Wiliamette Industries) at 7, In re Cor-
rugated Container Antitrust Litigation, No. 79-2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979).
147. "The experience of parties where such [sharing] agreements have been in effect has been
that settlement discussions occur on a more rational basis, with liability logically related to culpa-
bility and impact upon the plaintiff, and settlement is thus promoted." ABA MAJOITv REPORT,
supra note 9, at 7. But see id. at 3 ("there are many occasions when sharing agreements cannot be
recommended in a client's best interests" and are often impractical to achieve); S. REP. No. 428,
96th Cong., 1st Ses. 2 (1979) (sharing agreements difficult to accommodate in nonconcentrated
industries).
148. 1979 Hearingr, supra note 54, at 101 (statement of Mr. Harold Kohn).
149. See Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179,
1185-86 (8th Cir. 1979); Brief for Appellants at 29, Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas
Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979); D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 705 (1973) (under present
no contribution rule, one intentional antitrust violator gets off scot-free and is unjustly enriched at
expense of nonsettling defendant).
150. See Memorandum of Mead Corp. Concerning the Issue of Contribution at 7, In re Fine
Paper Antitrust Litigation, J.P.M.D.L. 323 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 1979). "[T]he lesson is simple [under
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pose and implead the entire conspiratorial network to disperse the
judgments among all members of the conspiracy.' 5 ' Conversely, oppo-
nents contend that courts should deny motions to implead additional
defendants for the purpose of contribution. They contend that courts
should not aid violators of the antitrust laws by allowing intentional
antitrust tortfeasors to seek contribution from fellow wrongdoers.152
The most frequently voiced concern in opposition to contribution is
that defendants lose all incentive to negotiate a settlement if faced with
continuing liability to nonsettling defendants. 53 Consequently, a con-
tribution rule would encourage defendants to remain in the action and
defend against liability. 54 Plaintiffs also have expressed a desire to re-
tain the no contribution rule to maximize plaintiffs ability to receive
settlements. 155
Proponents of contribution refer to the areas of securities and tort
litigation to substantiate their claim that contribution will not affect the
incidence of settlements. 56 Instead, a contribution rule might foster a
desire among defendants to settle with plaintiffs as one entity.'5 7
no contribution rule]: If guilty, settle and settle early, because you can get a lower price and keep
the vast bulk of the profits made from the conspiracy." Memorandum of Westvaco Corp. in
Opposition to Motions to Dismiss its Cross Claims for Contribution at 45, In re Fine Paper Anti-
trust Litigation, J.P.M.D.L. 323 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 1979).
151. See Corbett, supra note 2, at 116, 141.
152. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886(A)(3), comment j (1979) (no man will be
permitted to base a cause of action on his own intentional tort); ANTITRUST & TRADE REa. REP.
(BNA) B-3, no. 917, June 7, 1979 ("violators of the Sherman Act are subject to felony prosecution,
and it should be contrary to public policy for federal courts to decide and apportion rights among
'felons' "). See also Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., No. 75-23-N, slip op. at 4 (M.D. Ala. May
18, 1979) (fairness argument in support of contribution dissipates when all alleged violators are
named in action and parties have executed good faith gettlements).
153. See S. REP. No. 428, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1979) (everyone will not "rush to settle"
under the proposed S. 1468). See also Brief for Appellees at 21 n.12, Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,995 (10th Cir.) ("[appellant's] bald assertion. . . that
settlements would not be impaired [by a contribution rule] defies common sense").
154. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, J.P.M.D.L. 323, slip. op. at 3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3,
1979). See also Rhodes, supra note 9, at 14 (July-Aug., 1979).
155. See Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., No. 75-23-N, slip op. at 5 (M.D. Ala. May 18, 1979)
("In antitrust actions where the litigation is almost certain to be complicated, expensive and
lengthy, encouraging such settlements puts the plaintiff in a much better position to recover dam-
ages against at least some defendants and thereby finance continued litigation against the remain-
ing defendants").
156. See Nat'l L.J., Nov. 19, 1979, at 23, col. 3.
157. See note 143 supra; Memorandum for Defendant (Beecham Group) in Opposition to
Bristol-Myer's Motion for Leave to Amend Answers to Assert Cross-Claims for Contribution at 9-
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V. SECONDARY POLICY ISSUES ADVANCED IN THE
CONTRIBUTION DEBATE
Participants in the contribution debate have raised a myriad of pol-
icy and constitutional arguments in support of their respective stances.
Champions of contribution invariably point to current trends in federal
common law to buttress contribution in the antitrust field.' 58 On closer
examination, most of the trends are inappropriate to the analysis of
contribution within the context of the antitrust laws.'59
Cases that have granted contribution under the Federal Employer's
Liability Act'60 apply state law, not federal common law, to justify the
allowance of contribution. 6 ' Actions decided under the Civil Rights
Act 162 have summarily allowed contribution without questioning the
propriety of a contribution rule.'63 In addition, the burden imposed on
the trial process in civil rights actions is minimal in comparison to anti-
trust contribution. 64
10, In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 647 (D.D.C. 1979) (defendants should be
encouraged to settle as group to minimize collusion).
Defendant in In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation suggested that a settling defendant might seek
indemnification from the plaintiff for any amount that the settling defendant would contribute to
the nonsettling defendants. See Memorandum of Westvaco Corp. in Opposition to Motions to
Dismiss its Cross-Claims for Contribution at 14, In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, J.P.M.D.L.
323 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 1979). The indemnification approach is an implicit recognition of the carve-
out rule. See notes 234-266 infra and accompanying text.
158. See notes 22-26 supra and accompanying text (negligence trend); notes 27-30 supra (ad-
miralty trend); notes 31-34 supra and accompanying text (Federal Employer's Liability Act, Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, Civil Rights Act cases); notes 35-37 supra (securities law cases). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 886(A), comment a (1979); UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION
AMONG JOINT TORTFEASORS ACT (1977).
159. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 307 (4th ed. 1971) (trend to allow contribution only
among equally unintentional tortfeasors); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886(A)(3) (1979).
160. See Employer's Liability Act of 1939, § 1, Pub. L. No. 76-382, 53 Stat. 1404 (codified at
45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 60 (1976)).
161. See note 34 supra.
162. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)(l)-(15) (1976)).
163. See Brief for Appellee at 21, Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply,
Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979). But see Younger v. Glamgoran Pipe & Foundry Co., 418 F.
Supp. 743, 797 (W.D. Va. 1976) (no federal right of contribution in sex discrimination case).
164. Compare Brief for Appellant at 26, Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty
Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979) (defendant who seeks contribution in Title VII case
need only prove existence of employer-union collective bargaining agreement to impose liability
upon third-party defendant for contribution) with In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 84 F.R.D. 40, 41 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (additional burdens imposed on court in evaluating claim
for contribution in antitrust context), af'd per curiam, No. 79-2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979).
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Cases arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act 165 also have applied
state law to justify contribution.166 The circuit court decisions in Gomes
v. Brodhurst6 7 and Knell v. Feltman'68 are often incorrectly cited to
substantiate the proposition that the federal judiciary should adopt
contribution among antitrust tortfeasors. Both opinions apply local
law, not federal common law, 169 to a negligent, rather than intentional,
tort action. 170 Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.'7 1 is the only opinion in
which a federal court enunciated a federal common-law rule of contri-
bution among negligent tortfeasors. The Kohr court, however, did not
address the allowance of contribution between intentional tort-
feasors. 172
Proponents of contribution frequently refer to the Supreme Court's
adoption of a contribution rule in the federal common law of admiralty
to support an argument in favor of antitrust contribution.173 Commen-
tators, however, have uniformly recognized that the law of admiralty is
an historical aberration of the federal common law.' 74
The most compelling trend of federal judicial support for contribu-
tion among intentional antitrust tortfeasors exists in the securities law
area.' 75 The allowance of contribution in the highly complex and fed-
erally regulated security laws, which also permit a private cause of ac-
tion, provides a reasonable analogy to the antitrust laws. 76 The rule of
in pari materia has allowed courts to award contribution under those
165. See Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 982 (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976)).
166. See note 34 supra.
167. 394 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1967).
168. 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
169. 394 F.2d 465, 467 (3d Cir. 1967) (application of Virgin Islands law); 174 F.2d 662 (D.C.
Cir. 1949) (application of District of Columbia law).
170. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
171. 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
172. Id. (negligent aviation disaster).
173. See notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text.
174. See 1 E. BENEDICT, ON ADMIRALTY § 104 (7th ed. 1974) (American admiralty courts
frequently search for supportive rules from any international jurisdiction); G. GILSOMER & C.
BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 2 (2d ed. 1975) (admiralty law embodies its own "special mys-
tery and. . . special-industry linkage"). See also Brief for Appellees at 17-18, In re Beef Industry
Antitrust Litigation, 607 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1979).
175. Fisher, Contribution in 10b-5 Actions, 33 Bus. LAW. 1821 (1978); Note, Contribution
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 1256.
176. See Brief for Appellants at 22, Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc.,
604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979). See also Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979)
(securities case citing Professional Beauty with approval).
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sections of the federal securities laws that do not expressly provide for
such a right.'77 One might contend, however, that the express statutory
allowance of contribution in the securities field suggests that courts
should not allow contribution in the antitrust field 178 because Congress
has not seen fit to engraft contribution into any section of the Sherman
or Clayton Acts.' 79
Critics of contribution forecast that adoption of a contribution rule
in the antitrust field will immeasurably complicate an already compli-
cated body of law.'I" Contribution among antitrust violators would en-
courage defendants to implead additional parties and add tangential
issues to the main claim.' 18 A contribution rule would force courts to
scrutinize the merits of these motions before trial 182 or in a separate
action and would detract from rapid adjudication of plaintiffs main
claim. The addition of new parties and issues to the main claim would
seriously impair plaintiff's right to control the action.'83 The prospect
177. See Brief for Appellees (Radcliff Materials) at 16, Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v.
Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979). See generally Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
442 U.S. 560 (1979) (circumstances under which private right of action for damages may be im-
plied from federal statute without express congressional approval).
178. See Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339, 1345
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
179. See Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,995, at
79,701 (10th Cir.). See also 1979 Hearings, supra note 54, at 52 (statement of Lowell E. Sachnoff)
(contribution in securities cases protects less culpable defendants than it would in antitrust con-
text).
180. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40, 41 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
See also notes 10, 64, 107 supra and accompanying text.
One commentator suggested that the majority in Professional Beauty devalued the complexity
factor because of their lack of contact with a trial caseload. The dissenting judge in Professional
Beauty, Judge Hanson, was a district judge sitting on the panel by designation and was more
attuned to the practical pitfalls of allowing contribution in antitrust litigation. See Brown, Contri-
bution Among Joint Tortfeasors, N.Y.L.J., July 10, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
181. Not only would the number of third party defendants increase, but so would the number
of intervenors wishing to participate in the defense of the action in the event that liability was
established against the named defendants. See Brief for Appellees at 21, Olson Farms, Inc. v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,995 (10th Cir.). See also Corbett, supra
note 2, at 137 (defendants "rewarded" for impleading new parties to the action).
182. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San
Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd., 542 F.2d 1076, 1085 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
940 (1977); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 647 (D.D.C. 1979); 6 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (CIvIL) 432-33 (1976).
183. See Brief for Appeliees (La Maur, Inc.) at 14, 15, Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v.
National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979). See also Professional Beauty Supply,
Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1979); Sabre Shipping Corp. v.
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of lengthy, multiparty contribution actions would deter private'8 4 attor-
neys general from securing enforcement of the antitrust laws.' 85
Advocates of contribution insist that contribution will not render an-
titrust litigation unmanageable.' 86 They argue that federal courts are
equipped with liberal procedural safeguards to oversee complex litiga-
tion.' 87 The allowance of contribution in other complex areas of the
law'8 8 has not paralyzed the adjudication of alleged wrongs. 189
Supporters have urged, in refutation of the right of control argu-
ment, 90 that a plaintiff certainly should not object to the addition of
other potential wrongdoers to the lawsuit."'" Additionally, the prospect
American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339, 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (plaintiffs right to con-
trol is legitimate interest).
184. A contribution rule would deter private plaintiffs from filing suit because of the unwill-
ingness of defendants to engage in settlements. Plaintiffs also desire to avoid long, involved, and
costly litigation. See note 155 supra and accompanying text.
185. See Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179,
1189-90 (8th Cir. 1979) (Hanson, J., dissenting) ("the net result [of a contribution rule] may be to
deter private plaintiffs of relatively limited means from bringing or maintaining a meritorious
suit"). See also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972); Brief for Appellants at 11,
Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,995 (10th Cir.) (effec-
tive enforcement of antitrust laws requires actions brought by private plaintiffs).
186. See Brief for Amicus Curiae (Southwest Industries) at 8, In re Corrugated Container
Antitrust Litigation, No. 79-2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979).
187. See Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 908 (5th Cir.
1979) (Morgan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I simply can't believe that the
discretionary nature of the Rule 42(b) provision would discourage an antitrust plaintiff from seek-
ing treble damages should the court recognize a right of contribution"); FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a),
42(b). But see Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 906 (5th Cir,
1979) (allowance of contribution "may open a Pandora's box of procedural problems, against
which district court discretion may prove a palliation"). See also Professional Beauty Supply, Inc.
v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1979).
188. See notes 22-37 supra and accompanying text. 'But see ANTITRUST & TRADE REO. REP.
(BNA) B-5, no. 917, June 7, 1979 (analogy to state tort law cases is imperfect).
189. See Rhodes, supra note 9, at 13.
190. One commentator has questioned the very existence of the plaintif's right to control. See
Address by Jonathan Rose, American Bar Association Antitrust Section Meeting (Aug. 13, 1979).
191. See Brief for Appellants at 13, Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-2] Trade
Cas. (CCH) 62,995 (10th Cir.) (right of control will be protected by procedural devices); Brief for
Appellants at 19, 28, Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th
Cir. 1979) (plaintiffs burden of proving existence of two party conspiracy will not be heightened
by addition of alleged co-conspirators); Memorandum of Westvaco Corp. in Contra to Motions to
Dismiss its Cross-Claims for Contribution at 34-38, In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation,
J.P.M.D.L. 323 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 1979) (third party plaintiffs will bear burden of proof of alleged
third party defendants' involvement in conspiracy). But see Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., No.
75-23-N, slip op. at 4 (M.D. Ala. May 18, 1979) (plaintiff, as injured party, should alone determine
who pays damages).
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of a defendant's motion for contribution will not discourage a private
attorney general from maintaining a suit.192 Finally, any slightly inju-
rious effect of a contribution rule on the right of control or the com-
plexity of the litigation should not, in itself, defeat the adoption of
contribution.'93
Antagonists of contribution assert that a contribution rule would
place an intolerable burden on the federal judiciary.'94 Contribution
would permit defendants to toll the antitrust statute of limitations in
perpetuity by repeatedly impleading or filing cross-claims against al-
leged wrongdoers to pressure plaintiffs into releasing their claims. 195
Opponents argue that precious docket space should not be reserved to
litigate stale and dilatory claims between intentional violators of the
law. 196
Proponents of contribution respond that a solution to the contribu-
tion question cannot rest on presumed bad faith abuses of a contribu-
tion rule. 97 Supporters of contribution also suggest that the rule will
provide a greater deterrent to potential antitrust violators than the cur-
rent no contribution rule. Members of the business community will
realize that although they are unnamed in the action or have negotiated
a favorable settlement, they will be unable to escape some degree of
192. Appellees in Olson Farms I challenged the intent of Congress to enlist private attorneys
general to enforce the antitrust laws. See Brief for Appellees at 20, Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,995 (10th Cir.). See Memorandum of Mead Corp.
Concerning the Issue of Contribution at 8 n.3, In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, J.P.M.D.L.
323 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 1979).
193. See United States v. Reliable Transfer, Co., 421 U.S. 397, 408 (1975) (admiralty action).
The Court in that case stated that "[clongestion in the courts cannot justify a legal rule that pro-
duces unjust results in litigation simply to encourage greedy out-of-court accommodations." Id.
194. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40, 41 (S.D. Tex.), a f'd
per curiam, No. 79-2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979); Brief for Appellees at 22, Olson Farms, Inc. v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,995 (10th Cir.). See also notes 94, 95, 107
supra and accompanying text.
195. See Brief for Appellees at 22, Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-2] Trade
Cas. (CCH) 62,995 (10th Cir.); Brief for Appellees at 20, In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation,
607 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1979); ABA MAJORITY REPORT, supra note 9, at 13-15.
196. See Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,995, at
79.701 (10th Cir.); Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 906 (5th
Cir. 1979) (Morgan, J., dissenting) (courts should not expend energy on intentional wrongdoers);
ABA MAJORITY REPORT, supra note 9, at 3 (suggesting imposition ofcut-offdate for contribution
claims).
197. See Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
978 (1975) (massive negligence action allowing contribution without any procedural difficulties).
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lidbility for their anticompetitive conduct.198
Critics of contribution urge that the shared liability concept will not
effectively deter wrongdoers. 99 The threat of a trebled judgment with-
out assistance of contribution should provide a greater deterrent.200 In
all probability, however, any evidence of the deterrent value of contri-
bution cuts both ways20' and should not be a decisive factor in aban-
doning the current no contribution rule.2 "2
Both sides in the contribution debate insist that the language of the
antitrust laws2"3 is consistent with their respective stances. 204 Advo-
cates of contribution suggest that Congress' inclusion of "treble dam-
age" remedies and criminal sanctions in the antitrust statutes reflects
Congress' desire to prevent one wrongdoer from absorbing the full
measure of damages.2" 5 Alternatively, the statutory imposition of
"joint and several liability" on antitrust violators indicates a congres-
sional intent to prohibit intentional wrongdoers from enjoying the
fruits of contribution. 20 6 Application of the various interpretations of
198. See Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179,
1185 (8th Cir. 1979).
199. See Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 130 (1932).
200. See Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 901 n.8 (5th
Cir. 1979) (business managers are risk adverse and deterred more by slight prospect of large loss
than strong prospect of small loss); El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., 11977-1] Trade Cas.
(CCH) T 61,533, at 72,112 (N.D. Cal. 1976). See also Corbett, supra note 2, at 137 (small company
faced with prospect of singular liability especially deterred by no contribution rule),
201. Deterrence arguments are relevant only if alleged intentional violators have knowledge
that contribution will not be available if they are found liable. See Wilson P. Abraham Constr.
Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 901 n.8 (5th Cir. 1979); Professional Beauty Supply, Inc.
v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1189 (8th Cir. 1979) (Hanson, J., dissenting).
202. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 40, 42 (S.D. Tex.), a]7'd
per curiam, No. 79-2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979). See also S. REP. No. 428, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18
(1979) (private, treble damage suits serve as greatest deterrent to antitrust wrongdoers).
203. See notes 20, 117-19 supra and accompanying text.
204. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1189
(8th Cir. 1979) (Hanson, J., dissenting) (allegiance to common-law rules cannot be allowed to
undermine objectives of antitrust laws). See also El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977-11
Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,533, at 72,112 (N.D. Cal. 1976),
205. See Memorandum By Potlach Corp. Concerning the Right of Treble Damage Antitrust
Defendants to Contribution and in Support of Motion to Dismiss Claims for Contribution
Against Settling Defendants at 17, In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, J.P.M.D.L. 323 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 3, 1979). But see Brief for Appellees at 18-19, Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
[1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,995 (10th Cir.) (no implied right of contribution action under
antitrust laws; no congressional intent to aid antitrust co-conspirators; Congress chose treble dam-
age remedy and criminal sanctions in lieu of contribution).
206. See Brief for Appellee (Radcliff Materials) at 31, Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v.
Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979).
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"treble damages" or "joint and several liability" to the contribution is-
sue may lead to divergent results.207 For this reason, it is unwise to rely
on statutory interpretation to resolve congressional silence on the con-
tribution question.2"8
Defendants in Professional Beauty and Abraham Construction al-
leged that the courts' failure to provide a right of contribution abridged
their substantive due process 209 and equal protection rights210 under
the fifth amendment."z ' The court in Abraham Construction applied a
mere rationality test to conclude that a denial of the appellants' motion
to implead for contribution did not infringe on defendants' substantive
due process rights. 212  The Abraham Construction court dismissed ap-
pellants' equal protection claims under a similar rational relation
test.213
Opponents of contribution rely on the holdings of two notable
United States Supreme Court antitrust decisions, Illinois Brick v. Illi-
nois2 t 4 and Perma Life Mujfers v. International Parts Corp.,21 5 to
207, See note 205 supra and accompanying text. But see 1979 Hearings, supra note 54, at 20
(contribution question must be resolved separately from "joint and several liability" terms).
208. See notes 117-19 supra and accompanying text. See generally Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Four factors are used to deter-
mine whether a private remedy is implicit in a federal statute: (1) Is plaintiff a member of the
class that the statute is designed to protect; (2) is there any presence of legislative intent to create
or deny the remedy; (3) would such a remedy be consistent with the underlying purposes of the
statute; and (4) is the remedy one which is traditionally governed by state law? Id. at 78.
209. The denial of contribution among joint tortfeasors may constitute a taking of a property
interest without due process of law. See Brief for Appellants at 10, Wilson P. Abraham Constr.
Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979); Brief for Appellants at 46, Professional
Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
210. See Brief for Appellants at 12, Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc.,
604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[wlithout contribution among joint tortfeasors there is no equality
of protection against all similarly situated; there is no equality in the liabilities imposed on persons
under like circumstances; there is no equality in the burden imposed on the one sued"). The
Professional Beautr court did not address the due process or equal protection issues.
211. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
212. See Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 904 (5th Cir.
1979). See also Parker v. Stetson-Ross Mach. Co., 427 F. Supp. 249, 251 (D.S.D. 1977); Arcell v.
Ashland Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 502, 378 A.2d 53, 68-69 (1977) (defendant cannot claim
deprivation of substantive due process from no contribution rule because due process clause guar-
antees only existing statutory or common-law rights).
213. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 904 (5th Cir. 1979).
Appellee (OKC Dredging, Inc.) maintained that the equal protection clause umbrella was not
applicable to the contribution debate because all antitrust violators are similarly treated. See
Brief for Appellees (OKC Dredging) at 22, Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus.,
Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979).
214. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
215. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
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support their position in the contribution debate. Opponents of contri-
bution argue that the indirect nature of the antitrust defendant's injury
should preclude defendant from seeking contribution because the
Supreme Court in Illinois Brick limited standing in antitrust actions to
purchasers directly harmed by defendants' actions.216 Advocates of
contribution refer to current legislative revision of Illinois Brick to re-
fute any reliance on that decision in resolving the contribution di-
lemma.21 7
Litigants have relied on the narrowing of the inpari delecto defense
in Perma Life to support the proposition that equally reprehensible de-
fendants do not deserve a right of contribution.2 1 8 Those unsympa-
thetic to contribution also have interpreted Perma Life to hold that the
right to file suit does not hinge on the degree of plaintiffs culpability.
A court, therefore, may assess liability against a defendant irrespective
of another party's fault.219
Defendants also have employed Perma Life to support contribu-
tion.22° Proponents of contribution interpret Perma Lfe to hold that
permitting actions between wrongdoers regardless of claimant's partici-
pation in the illegality furthers the objectives of the antitrust laws.22 t
Congressional reaction to Illinois Brick and the plethora of plausible
holdings of Perma Life do not clarify the contribution issue. The im-
216. See Brief for Appellee (Radeliff Materials) at 34, Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp, v.
Texas Indus., Inc. 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979). See also Supplemental Memorandum of Appellee
(Safeway Stores) at 8, Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,995 (10th Cir.); ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) B-6, no. 917, June 7, 1979 (reluctance
of Supreme Court to create new area of antitrust liability with incidental effects on complexity of
antitrust litigation without express congressional approval).
217. See S. 300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). See also ANTITRUST & TRADE REO. REP. (BNA)
A-18, no. 931, Sept. 20, 1979.
218. See Brief for Appellee (OKC Dredging) at 19 n.6, Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v.
Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979) (under Perma Lfe, plaintiff is denied recovery
when plaintiff and defendant are equally responsible for plaintiffs injury). See also Brief for
Appellee (Radcliff Materials) at 36, Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604
F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979) (contribution rule would allow supplier-defendant in Perma Life to file
counterclaim for contribution against dealer-plaintiff).
219. See Brief for Appellee at 8, In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 607 F.2d 167 (5th
Cir. 1979).
220. See Brief for Appellant at 29, Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Sup-
ply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979); D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 704 (1973).
221. See Brief for Appellant at 28, Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-2] Trade
Cas. (CCH) 62,995 (10th Cir.); Brief for Appellant at 21, Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v.
Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979).
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pact of Perma Lfe and Illinois Brick on the Supreme Court's future
treatment of the contribution issue remains speculative.2
Many observers of the contribution debate advocate that Congress,
and not the courts, should resolve the matter.2 3 Litigants feel that
courts are inadequately equipped to provide a sensible answer to the
problem. 24 Judicial purists, however, believe that Congress purposely
drafted the antitrust laws ambiguously to allow the courts freedom to
expand the law as justice requires.2 25 There is little merit in contesting
the role of the court in the resolution of the contribution question.
Counsel, litigants, and the business community require an answer to
the contribution issue irrespective of the source of such guidance.22 6
A distillation of the more conclusive arguments espoused by partici-
pants in the contribution debate reveals three compelling findings.
First, under a pure no contribution rule (contribution without carve-
out), a nonsettling defendant in a multiparty antitrust action is often
coerced into negotiating a settlement with plaintiffs when other defend-
ants settle out of the action.227 Secondly, a pure contribution rule un-
doubtedly would complicate litigation and impose attendant burdens
222. See Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,995, at
79,702 (10th Cir.). "There has been no linkage by the Supreme Court or by Congress between
[Perma Lfe and the contribution issue] . . . and the existence of such a linkage is doubtful at
best." Id.
223. See Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. 78-1773, slip op. at 4 (10th Cir. Nov. 8,
1979); Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 906 (5th Cir. 1979);
Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1190 (8th Cir.
1979) (Hanson, J., dissenting); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F.
Supp. 1339, 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See generally S. 1468, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
224. See Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,995, at
79,704 (10th Cir.); ABA MAJORITY REPORT, supra note 9, at 9. "Definitive rules of law may take
years to evolve. Thus, comprehensive legislation ... can cut short those years of litigation and
attendant uncertainty as to many such rules .... " Id.
225. See United States v. United States Gypsum Corp., 438 U.S. 422,434 (1978); Chicago Bd.
of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,
60 (1911). In addition, congressional action on the subject may be a long and involved process.
Senate bill 1468, introduced in June of 1979, needed six months to achieve the approval of the
Senate Judiciary Committee. "Although the bill could be called to the Senate floor for a vote,
Senate aides find ultimate passage hard to imagine." ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-
17, no. 942, Dec. 6. 1979. Furthermore, any type of legislation will not resolve all issues surround-
ing the contribution question and will require some measure of judicial interpretation. Seegener-
ally Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1183 (8th
Cir. 1979); ABA MINORITY REPORT, upra note 9, at 2.
226. See notes 115-16 supra and accompanying text.
227. See notes 143-47 supra and accompanying text.
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on the courts.228 Finally, a pure contribution rule would undermine
the preferred and necessary practice of settlement in antitrust litiga-
tion.229 On balance, therefore, the merits of a pure contribution rule do
not appear to outweigh the utility of the current no contribution rule.230
Although deficiencies exist in many circumstances under the present
no contribution rule,23' a formula must be fashioned to rectify these
inadequacies without disturbing the positive characteristics of the no
contribution rule.232 The formula should be coherently and rapidly in-
corporated, without regard to procedural variances, into the entire
body of the antitrust laws to promote certainty and equitable adminis-
tration of the antitrust laws.233
VI. CARVE-OUT: AN EMERGING SOLUTION TO THE CONTRIBUTION
QUESTION IN ANTITRUST LITIGATION
The carve-out technique represents a progressive solution to the con-
tribution morass.234 Carve-out, a hybrid of the alternatives to contribu-
228. See notes 180-85, 194-96 supra and accompanying text.
229. See notes 153-55 supra and accompanying text.
230. CompareUNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT (1955 & 1977 versions)
andABA MINOIUTY REPORT, supra note 9, at 1 (no contribution imposed against settling defend-
ants) with S. 1468, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979) andABA MjoRIrm REPORT, supra note 9 (contri-
bution advocated in cases in which defendant has not executed good faith settlement; good faith,
settling defendant is immune from contribution and an amount determined with reference to set-
tlement is carved-out of plaintiffs claim).
231. See notes 139-43, 149-51, 227 supra and accompanying text.
232. See notes 140-42, 152, 180-85, 194-96, 199, 200, 206, 232 supra and accompanying text.
233. See notes 115-16 supra and accompanying text.
234. Three federal courts have implicitly acknowledged the existence of a hybrid, carve-out
rule in antitrust cases. Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., [1980-1] Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,059, at 77,254 (E.D. Ark. 1979) (letter opinion); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D.
652 (D.D.C. 1979); El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) % 61,533, at
72,112 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (courts might fashion rule under appropriate circumstances to protect
rights of both settling and nonsettling defendants in contribution debate). The court in Hedges
Enterprises v. Continental Group, Inc., [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,717, at 77,993 (E.D. Pa.),
however, denied defendant's motion for claim reduction (carve-out). The Corrugated Container
court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the carve-out issue. See No. 79-2439, slip op. at 2 (5th Cir.
Oct. 30, 1979). See also Answer for Defendant (Beatrice Foods) at 5, In re Arizona Dairy Prod-
ucts Litigation, No. 74-569A, 74-736 (D. Ariz. Aug. 5, 1980) (Beatrice Foods asserts affirmative
defense of claim reduction).
Many courts in nonantitrust cases have fashioned a carve-out rule. See Leger v. Drilling Well
Control, Inc., 592 F.2d 1246, 1249 (5th Cir. 1979); Kassman v. American Univ., 546 F.2d 1029,
1033 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Brightheart v. McKay, 420 F.2d 242, 243-44 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Gomes
v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 468 (3d Cir. 1965). See also Luke v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 523 F.2d
1190, 1191 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (application of claim reduction rule under Louisiana law
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/11
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tion, permits reduction before trebling of a plaintiffs monetary claim
against nonsettling defendants after one defendant has executed a set-
tlement pact with plaintiffs. The carve-out rule treats all parties to the
litigation equitably. The nonsettling defendant is "credited" each time
a fellow defendant enters into a settlement with the plaintiffs.235 The
plaintiff is not affected adversely by the execution of settlemefit agree-
ments because his potential recovery from nonsettling defendants is re-
duced commensurate with the amount of damages paid by the settling
defendant to the plaintiff.236 The carve-out rule also retains the de-
fendant's incentive to settle with the plaintiff237 because settling defend-
ant's exposure to additional liability is terfhinated on court approval of
the settlement pact. 38
A carve-out rule reduces the inequity imposed on a single, nonset-
tling defendant, without coercing that defendant into negotiating a set-
tlement because a nonsettling defendant will not assume financial
responsibility for the tortious conduct of settling defendants.239 In
some cases, settlements could reduce a plaintiff's pretrial claim to a
point where the claim against remaining nonsettling defendants is min-
imal. The reason for adopting contribution is lost when settling de-
fendants no longer are coerced into premature settlements. The carve-
out rule will not complicate antitrust actions or burden the courts.240 A
in personal injury action on pro-rata basis); Martello v. Hawley, 300 F.2d 721, 724 (D.C. Cir.
1962) (pro-rata).
Proposed congressional legislation, although advocating contribution in price-fixing actions, has
incorporated the carve-out rule (on a greater of sales/purchases or settlement method) for a de-
fendant's good faith settlement with plaintiff's class. S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). The
ABA Section on Antitrust Law has adopted an analogous approach to S. 1468, except that plain-
tiff's claim would be carved out by the relative fault of the settling party. ABA MAjomiTy RE-
PORT, supra note 9, at 10 (report calls for contribution in all types of antitrust cases).
235. See note 3 supra (under current practice, plaintiffs claim is reduced by defendant's settle-
ment amount after trebling).
236. Antitrust plaintiffs may express displeasure at the adoption of carve-out. Under current
practices, plaintiffs often recover both a trebled judgment and any monies procured through settle-
ments. A plaintiff, however, is not entitled to more than one recovery for the same injury. See
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 348 (1971).
237. See Brief for Appellees (Menasha Corp. and Stone Container Corp.) at 3, In re Corru-
gated Container Antitrust Litigation, No. 79-2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979).
238. See id. at 13.
239. See Brief for Appellees (Weyerhaeuser Co. and Williamette Industries) at 3, In re Corru-
gated Container Antitrust Litigation, No. 79-2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979). See also notes 143-46
supra and accompanying text.
240. Carve-out would not require use of third party actions, separate actions, or cross-claims
to achieve its goals. The assessment of the relative fault of a settling defendant would be the only
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carve-out rule, implemented without regard to the type of antitrust vio-
lation alleged in plaintiffs complaint, provides all parties to the litiga-
tion with certainty of the law. 4'
A settlement under carve-out punishes the settling, alleged antitrust
wrongdoer, compensates the injured plaintiff, and comports with the
purposes of the antitrust laws. 42 A carve-out formula also ameliorates
the frequency of collusive practices among litigants because plaintiffs
will realize that the settlement agreement will affect the amount of the
final judgment. 24 3 Carve-out insures that a plaintiff can maintain the
right to control the action because named defendants will not be able to
implead third party defendants or file cross-claims for contribution. 44
Additionally, carve-out retains the deterrent value of the no contribu-
tion rule24 5 without discouraging private attorneys general from bring-
ing suit to enforce the antitrust laws.2 46
Carve-out is not, however, a panacea. The palatibility of carve-out
depends on the amount "carved-out," before trebling, of plaintiff's
claim for relief. Courts and commentators have posited five different
methods of carve-out calculation.247 First, some courts have advocated
carve-out on a pro-rata scale z.2 4  Although the pro-rata method is easily
administered and provides sufficient deterrent value,249 it may expose a
nonsettling defendant to more than his fair share 6f liability.25 °
practical difficulty under carve-out before trial; however, "the inquiry into relative fault is not
appreciably different from the determinations now made under Rule 23 [of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure]." ABA MAJoRIY REPORT, supra note 9, at 7.
241. See note 233 supra and accompanying text.
242. See notes 117-18 supra and accompanying text.
243. See generally notes 137-39 supra. Adoption of a method of carve-out that reduces plain-
tiffs claim by the "average-of" settling defendant's relative fault and the settlement amount will
increase plaintiff's reluctance to participate in a collusive settlement negotiation. A plaintiff will
not want to reduce his claim by more than the settling defendant's fair share.
244. See generally notes 183, 240 supra and accompanying text (under carve-out, no addi-
tional parties named to the action or tangential issues added to main claim).
245. See Brief for Appellees (Weyerhaeuser Co. and Williamette Industries) at 9, In re Corru-
gated Container Antitrust Litigation, No. 79-2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979).
246. See generally notes 184-85 supra and accompanying text.
247. See generally Note, 18 STAN. L. REV. 486 (1966) (methods of contribution among joint
tortfeasors).
248. See Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th
Cir. 1979); Luke v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 523 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir. 1975) (personal injury); Martello
v. Hawley, 300 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (personal injury).
249. See note 260 infra.
250. See ABA, REPORT OF THE CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE COMMITTEE TO THE SEC-
TION OF ANTITRUST LAW REGARDING RIGHTS OF CONTRIBUTION AMONG DEFENDANTS at 21
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Secondly, the Uniform Commission on State Laws in 1955 proposed
that plaintiffs claim should be reduced by the amount of defendant's
settlement. 25' This method may work to the disadvantage of the non-
settling defendant by compelling him to accept a judgment in excess of
his relative fault252 and by inducing collusion between settling defend-
ants and plaintiffs.2 3
Thirdly, the American Bar Association Section on Antitrust Law has
advocated a relative (comparative) fault model.254 A relative fault rule
would necessitate a pretrial hearing on the merits before the court
could reduce the settling defendant's share from plaintiff's claim.255
The relative fault rule also may discourage plaintiffs from entering into
settlements because the reduction of plaintiffs claim by the degree of
settling defendant's fault may be in excess of the settlement amount
recovered by plaintiff.256
Fourthly, the Uniform Commission on State Laws in 1977 urged that
plaintiff's claim be reduced by the greater of either the settlement
amount or the relative fault of the settling defendant. 7 Under the
"greater of" rule, a plaintiff assumes the risk that the relative fault of
the settling defendant might exceed the amount of damages received by
plaintiff.258 Further, if plaintiff recovered a "profitable" settlement in
excess of the settling defendant's culpability, the judgment would not
(Aug. 14, 1979). "A per capita rule does little to aid the small and innocent defendant who may
face liability in excess of its net worth. Moreover, a per capita rule might encourage defendants to
name third parties in order to reduce their per capita share." Id.
251. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT (1955).
252. See note 250 supra and accompanying text.
253. See Address by Jonathan Rose, American Bar Association Antitrust Section Meeting
(Aug. 13, 1979).
254. See ABA MAJORITY REPORT, supra note 9.
255. See ABA MINORITY REPORT, supra note 9, at 7.
256. The settling defendant's market share also may be an appropriate substitute for relative
fault, particularly in multiparty, horizontal, price-fixing cases. See Brief for Appellees (Weyer-
haeuser Co. and Williamette Industries) at 12, In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation,
No. 79-2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979); Memoranda of Defendants Weyerhaeuser Co. and Westvaco
Corp. Concerning the Issue of Contribution at 8, 9, In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation,
J.P.M.D.L. 323 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 1979); ABA MAJORITY REPORT, supra note 9, at 3. But see S.
REP. No. 428, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1979) ("No plaintiffin his right mind is going to settle with
a defendant with a small net worth and a large market share if by doing so he is going to take
thirty or forty or fifty percent of the market out of the case.").
257. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT (1977). See also Olson Farms,
Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,995, at 79,704 (10th Cir.); N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 15.108(a) (McKinney 1978); S. 1468, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
258. See note 256 supra and accompanying text.
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award plaintiff the benefit of his bargain. This rule would discourage
plaintiffs from settling to an even greater extent than the relative fault
method.
Finally, an "average of' carve-out rule would reduce plaintiff's claim
by the mean of the settlement amount and the relative fault of the set-
tling defendant.259 Adoption of the "average of' rule would neither
overtly deter plaintiffs from executing settlement agreements260 nor un-
fairly penalize the nonsettling defendant.26' Plaintiffs would hesitate to
collude with defendants because the value of plaintifs claim against
nonsettling defendants would depend on the amount of the settlement.
VII. CONCLUSION
The federal antitrust laws should not incorporate a right of contribu-
tion among defendants in a private, treble damage antitrust action.
The traditional federal common-law rule, which denies a right of con-
tribution among all antitrust defendants, is imperfect yet preferable to
a pure contribution rule. Statutory or judicial acceptance of a carve-
out formula in antitrust actions may provide a solution to the inade-
quacies inherent in the no contribution approach without eliminating
the numerous positive traits of the traditional rule. The Supreme
Court's inevitable statement on the contribution issue262 should contain
an acknowledgement of the validity and vitality of carve-out in private,
treble damage antitrust actions.
R. Mark MeCareins
259. The average of the settling defendant's market share and the amount of the settlement
might be employed as a carve-out measure in a horizontal price-fixing action. See note 256 supra.
260. See note 256 supra and accompanying text.
261. See notes 250, 253 supra and accompanying text.
262. The Supreme Court dismissed as moot its original grant of certiorari in the Corrugated
Container litigation, 49 U.S.L.W. 3288 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1980) (79-972), because petitioners eventu-
ally settled with plaintiffs' class. See ANTIRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-1, no. 986, Oct.
23, 1980; Nat'l L.J., Nov. 3, 1980, at 7, col. 1.
[Vol. 58:975
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/11
